

# One Bank One UniCredit

## 2017 Group Compensation Policy

Welcome to  
 **UniCredit**

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# Letter from the Chairman

“ In 2016 UniCredit launched an in-depth review of the group’s strategy, the results of which were announced at a Capital Markets Day in London on December 13, 2016. *Transform 2019*, our 2016-2019 Strategic Plan, will be the foundation for everything we do over the next years.

In this environment, for 2017, while confirming our policy key pillars, we are presenting a revised compensation framework. The objective is to incentivize all our colleagues to focus on the implementation of our *Transform 2019* Plan, execute it with discipline, meet our shareholders’ expectations and, above all, further improve our customer focus. ”

## Alessandro Caltagirone

Chairman of the Remuneration Committee



Dear Shareholders,

The banking sector is constantly changing – in terms of its regulations, its growth prospects and the needs of its customers.

In this context, it is important to be ready to seize opportunities as they arise, which includes developing compensation policies that support the achievement of strategic business targets, motivate and reward the best people and ensure the sound and prudent management of risk.

The compensation structures and incentives that UniCredit has employed for a number of years are designed to support the bank’s commitment to motivate all of its stakeholders to strive for long-term profitability, in accordance with national and international regulatory requirements and in line with market practices.

In 2016, this approach resulted in compensation decisions consistent with the bank’s results, confirming the strong links we have established between remuneration, risk and performance sustainability.

In 2016, UniCredit also launched an in-depth review of the group’s strategy, the results of which were announced at a Capital Markets Day in London on December 13, 2016. *Transform 2019*, our 2016-2019 Strategic Plan, will be the foundation for everything we do over the next years.

In this environment, for 2017, while confirming our policy key pillars, we are presenting a revised compensation framework. The objective is to incentivize all our colleagues to focus on the implementation of our *Transform 2019* Plan, execute it with discipline, meet our shareholders’ expectations and, above all, further improve our customer focus.

Among the important adjustments that have been made, in keeping with major changes faced by our industry and our company, the policy regarding fixed remuneration has been revised; it now uses market medians as a reference.

A new Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) will also be launched for senior management; the plan’s time horizon dovetails *Transform 2019*. By providing for the award of performance shares contingent upon the achievement of strategic targets, the LTIP aims to further align the interests of management and shareholders. For this same purpose, the group’s stock ownership guidelines now apply to all senior management positions.

In 2017, we maintain our commitment to offer comprehensive and useful information on compensation. We achieve this by presenting, alongside our Compensation Policy, a number of other tools that serve to highlight its main points in a concise and accessible manner.

In closing, on behalf of my fellow members of the Remuneration Committee, I would like to thank our investors for making themselves available to discuss and exchange views on this important subject. This vital, extended dialogue, which has been ongoing for several years now, enables us to share our respective requirements and has been fundamental to the formation of our compensation policies.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Alessandro Caltagirone'.

**Alessandro Caltagirone**  
Chairman of the  
Remuneration Committee

Section I

# Executive Summary



# 1. Our Compensation Policy

The implementation of the principles set in our Group Compensation Policy provides the framework for the design of reward programs across the group.

Policy standards ensure that compensation is aligned to business objectives, market reality and shareholders' long term interests.

UniCredit's compensation approach has been consolidated over time under our group governance, to be compliant with the most recent national and international regulatory requirements. Our approach is connected to performance, market-awareness, and aligned with business strategy and shareholders' interests.

The key pillars of our Group Compensation Policy (Section II) reflect the most recent regulations in terms of remuneration and incentive policies and practices, in order to build year-by-year – in the interest of all stakeholders – remuneration systems aligned with long-term strategies and goals. These are linked with company results and adequately adjusted in order to take into account all risks, consistent with

capital and liquidity levels needed to support all activities and to avoid distorted incentives that could lead to breach of law or to excessive risk taking.

On December 13, 2016, in connection to our 2016-2019 Strategic Plan *Transform 2019* (in the following also "Strategic Plan *Transform 2019*" or "*Transform 2019*") presented to analysts and investors during a Capital Markets Day in London, the CEO Jean Pierre Mustier announced the review of our compensation strategy and the main elements of the new framework. A specific description is reported in the Annual Compensation Report.

**Focus Transform 2019**  
See Section III for more information



## 1.1 Key Pillars

Clear and transparent governance

Compliance with regulatory requirements and principles of good business conduct

Continuous monitoring of market trends and practices

Sustainable pay for sustainable performance

Motivation and retention of all employees, with particular focus on talents and mission-critical resources

Details  
Section II • Chapter 1

**The key pillars of our Group Compensation Policy ensure a correct definition of competitive compensation levels, internal equity and transparency.**

Group Compensation Policy is aligned to the latest national and international regulatory requirements<sup>1</sup>. Full compliance with compensation policies and processes is assured through **involvement of Company Control Functions**, such as Compliance, Audit and Risk Management that also guarantee the coherence with the Risk Appetite Framework, in line with sector regulations.

<sup>1</sup> i.e. Capital Requirement Directive IV (CRD IV); EBA Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS); Bank of Italy "Disposizioni di vigilanza per le Banche", 7th update to the Circular n. 285 of December 17, 2013



## 1.2 Compensation benchmarking and policy target

Focus Transform 2019

Update of the peer group for compensation benchmarking, performed by the independent advisor of the Remuneration Committee

Definition of specific peer group at country/division level to assure competitive alignment with the market of reference

Details  
Section III • Chapter 3

With specific reference to group Executive population, the Remuneration Committee defines, supported by an independent external advisor, a list of selected competitors that represent our **group-level peers** (disclosed on chapter 3, Compensation Report). Compensation benchmarking analysis is performed in comparison to this peer group. As a policy target, Identified Staff's (Material Risk Takers) fixed compensation is set on the market median as reference with individual positioning being defined on the basis of specific performance, potential and people strategy decisions, as well as UniCredit's performance over time.



## 1.3 Identified Staff definition

Application of qualitative and quantitative criteria which are common at European level defined by EBA RTS

Details  
Section III • Paragraph 5.1

**Identified Staff population** has been updated ensuring full compliance with current regulations. The identification has followed a structured evaluation process both at group and local level, based on the application of qualitative and quantitative criteria common at European level. The result of the evaluation process for the definition of Identified Staff has led to the identification of **ca. 900 resources for 2017**.



## 1.4 Ratio between variable and fixed compensation

In compliance with the regulatory requirements, the 2:1 ratio represents the maximum limit to the ratio between variable and fixed components of the remuneration for all employees belonging to business functions, including Identified Staff

[Details](#)  
Section II • Paragraph 3.1

In compliance with applicable regulations, it is not changed - for the **personnel belonging to the business functions - the adoption of a maximum ratio between variable and fixed remuneration of 2:1<sup>2</sup>**.

**For the rest of the staff a maximum ratio between the components of remuneration equal to 1:1 is usually adopted, except for the staff of the Company Control Functions**, for which it is expected that fixed remuneration is a predominant component of total remuneration and incentive mechanisms are consistent with the assigned tasks as well as being independent of results from areas under their control.

For these functions, in particular, the maximum weight of the variable component will take into account the differences between national rules and regulations in application of Directive 2013/36 / EU in the various countries in which the group operates<sup>3</sup>, in order to ensure equal operating conditions in the market and the ability to attract and retain individuals with professionalism and capacity adapted to the needs of the group.

The adoption of a ratio of 2:1 between variable and fixed compensation must not have any implications on the bank's capacity to continue to respect all prudential rules, in particular capital requirements.

This approach allows UniCredit to maintain a strong link between pay and performance, as well as competitiveness in the market. Our main peers have also taken the same approach in order to limit the effects of the un-even playing field in markets where the cap is not present, to avoid the rigidity of the cost structure derived from a possible increase of fixed costs and to guarantee the alignment with multi-year performance, through deferring a relevant component of the variable compensation.

<sup>2</sup> As approved by the Annual General Meeting of May 13, 2014

<sup>3</sup> In particular, for the Identified Staff of Italian Company Control Functions, the ratio between the variable and the fixed components of remuneration cannot exceed the limit of one third, as per BankIT provision (Circular n. 285 17 Dec 2013), 7th update of November 18, 2014



## 1.5 Incentive system linked to the annual performance

The Group Incentive System 2017, that confirms the “bonus pool” approach introduced in 2014, provides for a strong link between remuneration, risk and sustainable profitability

Such a system provides for an overall performance assessment both at individual level and at group/country/division level

[Details](#)  
Section III • Paragraph 5.3

**8 bonus pools** whose size is linked to the profitability of each country/division.

**Entry conditions:** a mechanism that determines the possible application of the malus clause (Zero Factor), on the basis of performance indicators in terms of profitability, capital and liquidity defined at both group and country/division level.

**Adjustments to the bonus pools** driven by the evaluation of the **risk and sustainability** for each country/division (alignment to the Group Risk Appetite Framework).

**Bonus allocation:** the incentive is allocated managerially, taking into consideration the available bonus pool, the individual performance evaluation based on risk-adjusted indicators and specific reference value for each position.

**Payout:** individual bonus composed of 50% cash and 50% shares for Identified Staff; paying out over a period up to 6 years, ensuring alignment with shareholders' interests and subject to malus and claw-back conditions, as legally enforceable.



## 1.6 Performance measurement

Review of the “KPI Bluebook” supports manager and incumbent to define the Performance Screen that refers to the annual Incentive System for the Identified Staff

[Details](#)  
Section III • Paragraph 5.4

**The KPI Bluebook** supports the definition of Performance Screens providing **a set of performance indicators and guidelines**. The categories of the main indicators of financial and non-financial group performance, annually defined within the KPI Bluebook, are certified with the involvement of Human Resources, Finance, Risk Management, Compliance, Group Sustainability, Group Stakeholder Insight and Internal Audit functions, which reflect the group's core operating profitability and risk profile. The KPI Bluebook includes KPIs defined within the scope of the Strategic Plan *Transform 2019*.



## 1.7 2017-2019 Long Term Incentive System

Focus Transform 2019 

A Long Term Incentive Plan has been introduced with the aim to aligning senior management<sup>4</sup> interests to long term value creation for the shareholders, share price and group performance appreciation, as well as to sustain a sound and prudent risk management

Details   
Section III • Paragraph 5.5

The Plan provides for the allocation of incentives based on shares, subject to the achievement of **specific performance indicators aligned to the Strategic Plan Transform 2019**.

The Plan is structured around a 3-year performance period, consistent with the UniCredit Strategic Plan, and provides for the allocation of the **possible award** in 2020.

The award is subject to a **3-year deferral period**, after the performance period, and to the application of a **cumulative Zero Factor condition**, providing for the respect of minimum conditions of profitability, liquidity and capital position.

In line with regulatory requirements additional **holding periods** are applied at the end of the deferral period.



## 1.8 Share ownership guidelines

Focus Transform 2019 

Share ownership guidelines set **minimum levels for company share ownership by relevant Executives<sup>5</sup>**, by assuring appropriate levels of personal investment in UniCredit shares over time. As part of our total compensation approach, we offer equity incentives that provide for opportunities of share ownership, in fully alignment with the applicable regulation requirements

Details   
Section II • Paragraph 3.5

At the end of 2011, the Board of Directors approved the share ownership guidelines **applied to the Chief Executive Officer, General Manager and Deputy General Manager roles, if any**.

On March 2017 the Board of Directors of UniCredit approved an update of the above mentioned share ownership guidelines, **extending their application to Senior Executive Vice President and Executive Vice President positions**, taking into consideration the roles that are currently covered, with the aim to align managerial interests to those of shareholders' for the execution of the 2016-2019 Strategic Plan *Transform 2019*.

The established levels should be reached, as a rule, within 5 years from the appointment in the role within the scope of the guidelines and should be maintained until the role is held. The achievement of the share ownership levels should be accomplished through a pro rata approach over 5 year period, granting a minimum amount of shares each year.

<sup>4</sup> The Identified Staff of Company Control Functions are not included in the Plan

<sup>5</sup> Considering the application, from 2016, of the new ratio between the variable and the fixed components of remuneration (which cannot exceed the limit of one third for the Identified Staff within Italian Control Functions, while the fixed remuneration is expected to be the predominant component for the Control Functions of other geographies), share ownership guidelines are not applied to the Executives who are part of Company Control Functions



## 1.9 Severance payments

Focus Transform 2019 

Continuous alignment with regulations/contract from time to time in force

Severance payouts take into consideration long-term performance, in terms of shareholder added-value. They do not reward failures or abuses and shall not exceed in general **24 months of total compensation, including notice** (in case of lack of law / National Labor agreement provisions as locally applicable)

Details   
Section II • Paragraph 3.3

**An update of the policy on payments to be agreed in case of early termination of a contract** (so called severance) with more restrictive provisions, is submitted for approval to the Annual General Meeting, according to the regulatory requirements issued by Bank of Italy in "*Disposizioni di vigilanza per le banche*" (Circular n.285 of December 17, 2013, 7th update of November 18, 2014).



## 1.10 2016 results and compensation decisions

### > 2016 Results

On December 13, 2016 the Board of Directors of UniCredit approved the 2016-2019 Strategic Plan, *Transform 2019*. This was presented, on the same day, to analysts and investors at a Capital Markets Day in London.

The Plan *Transform 2019* was produced with the aim of maintaining a level of profitability that is sustainable over time, using the leverage of a simple commercial bank business model, strengthening cross-selling activities (i.e. commercial synergies) and offering customers access to an extensive network of branches.

The implementation of *Transform 2019* has commenced, with the main focus on group's capital optimization, reduction of balance sheet risk profile, improvement of profitability, ensuring continuous transformation of operations to allow for additional cost efficiencies and cross-selling across group entities, whilst maintaining flexibility to seize value creating opportunities together with further improved risk discipline.

The Plan *Transform 2019*, based on five well-defined strategic pillars, is already showing tangible results:

- **Strengthen and optimize capital:** on February 6, 2017, €13 bn rights issue was launched, fully underwritten, at terms and conditions in line with market practice for similar transactions, by a consortium of leading international banks. The rights issue was closed on March, 2 2017. The capital increase is the first tangible step in terms of strengthening and optimizing UniCredit's capital position, leading to a post rights issue fully loaded CET1 of 11.15%<sup>6</sup> in 4Q16. CET1 ratio above 12% including Pioneer and Pekao disposals (c.1.5p.p.). The CET1 ratio target for the end of 2019 is confirmed as above 12.5%. We have confirmed a 20-50% cash dividend payout policy as of FY17, as disclosed in Plan *Transform 2019*.
- **Improve asset quality:** decisive actions on legacy issue mainly related to the Italian portfolio, with €8.1 bn of extraordinary loan loss provisions (LLP) in 4Q16, actively de-risking the balance sheet. Group non performing exposures (NPE)<sup>7</sup> down to €56.3 bn and NPE ratio reduced from 15.1% to 11.8 % Q/Q.

<sup>6</sup> Including the benefit of capital increase from the reversal of thresholds related to financial participations and DTA (equal to 41bp)

<sup>7</sup> The perimeter of Non Performing Exposures (NPE) as per definition of EBA is substantially equivalent to perimeter of impaired exposures as per BankIT Circular 272. NPE are broken down in gross bad loans, unlikely-to-pay and past due






- Transformation of the operating model:** the push for a sustainable lower cost structure supported by the reduction of 2,800 FTE<sup>8</sup>. Among other factors, this leads to a €362 m reduction in staff expenses in 2016. In addition, on February 4, 2017, an agreement was signed with the Italian Trade Unions, for the remaining 3,900 FTE. The Plan *Transform 2019*'s full target of 14,000 exits have now been secured throughout the group. Furthermore, the group progressed with branch reductions with 273 closures in Western Europe in 2016, 29% of the targeted closures have already been executed.
- Maximize commercial bank value:** the priority continues to be to deliver UniCredit's quality products and services to its extensive client franchise and provide access to the group's unique Western, Central and Eastern European network. Leveraging on UniCredit's "go-to" bank status for corporate clients the CIB confirmed leadership positions in "EMEA Corporate Loans EUR-denominated"<sup>9</sup> and "Sponsor driven Acquisition Finance EMEA"<sup>10</sup>. Also, UniCredit was ranked number one in Italy, Germany, Austria and CEE in syndicated loans activity<sup>11</sup>. The group's leadership position in the CEE was further strengthened thanks to the acquisition of over 700,000 new clients.
- Adopt a lean but strong steering Group Corporate Center:** managerial steering executed through cascading of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) throughout the group.

**Bonus pool performance metrics (pre bonus)**

● 2015 ● 2016 budget ● 2016 actual n.m.=not meaningful



Bonus pool performance metrics pre bonus: Net Operating Profit (Commercial Banking Italy+NonCore, Commercial Banking Germany, Commercial Banking Austria, CEE); Net Operating Profit Group; Profit Before Taxes (AG); GOP-EL-ke (CIB)  
Group, CB Italy, Non Core and CB AT reported negative Net Profit in 2016.


8 Full Time Equivalent  
9 Source: Dealogic Loanware, per 3 January 2017. Period: 1 Jan – 31 Dec 2016  
10 Source: Dealogic Analytics, per 3 January 2017. Period: 1 Jan – 31 Dec 2016  
11 #1 in Syndicated loans Italy, #1 in Syndicated loans Germany, #1 in Syndicated loans Austria, #1 in Syndicated loans CEE, Source: Dealogic Loanware, per 3 January 2017. Period: 1 Jan – 31 Dec 2016

**Compensation decisions**

With reference to the year 2016, the UniCredit Board of Directors has considered the proposals of the Remuneration Committee and the guidelines of the regulatory authorities on variable remuneration. The evaluation regarding compensation decisions, as done also in the previous years, was supported by a rigorous group governance process in order to guarantee coherence and transparency for all the participants involved.

The Board of Directors, in consideration of the group's results for the year 2016, while expressing sincere appreciation for the work done by the management in relation with the in-depth strategic review that brought the presentation and the launch of the 2016-2019 Strategic Plan *Transform 2019*, resolved not to proceed with any bonus payment for 2016 for the CEO, General Manager and other Executives with strategic responsibilities, independently from individual performance assessment.

Furthermore, the Board of Directors approved the following distribution of the bonus for the Identified Staff population (ca. 1,050 resources)<sup>12</sup>, defined on the basis of the mere application of the 2016 Group Incentive System rules approved by the Shareholders' Meeting:



**Our Compensation Disclosure**

The Annual Compensation Report (Section III) provides the description of our compensation practices and the implementation outcomes of Group Incentive Systems, as well as remuneration data with a focus on non-Executive Directors and Identified Staff, defined in line with regulatory requirements.

Full disclosure on compensation payout amounts, deferrals and ratio between variable and fixed components of remuneration for Identified staff is provided in the Annual Compensation Report (Section III - paragraph 7.1), including data regarding Directors, General Managers and other Executives with strategic responsibilities categories.

Data pursuant sect. 84-quarter Consob Issuers Regulation Nr. 11971, Compensation report – Section II, as well as the information on incentive systems under 114-bis of legislative decree 58/1998 ("Testo Unico della Finanza" – "TUF") are included in the attachments to the 2017 Group Compensation Policy, published on UniCredit's website, in the section dedicated to 2017 Shareholders' Meeting.

12 Information included in the document reflects the classification under IFRS5 of Pioneer and Bank Pekao, accounted as "Held for Sale" from December 2016. Data restated accordingly



## 1.11 Chief Executive Officer and General Manager variable and fixed compensation data


On June 30, 2016 the Board of Directors of UniCredit SpA unanimously approved the appointment of Jean Pierre Mustier as the group's new Chief Executive Officer starting from July 12, 2016 and replacing Federico Ghizzoni.

On the basis of the decision taken by the UniCredit Board of Directors in the same session of June 30, 2016, the remuneration package for 2016 assigned to the new Chief Executive Officer of the group had the same size and structure of the previous CEO's, except for the participation to the 2015-2018 Long Term Incentive Plan approved by the Shareholders' Meeting on May 13, 2015.

With reference to 2016, the CEO received a fixed remuneration of € 2 m, including director's remuneration. It has been paid pro rata for the period July 12, 2016 - December 31, 2016 for the amount of € 0.95 m. Consistent with the resolution of the Board of Directors on March, 13 2017, the CEO did not receive any variable remuneration for 2016.

In addition, during a Capital Markets Day held in London on December 13, 2016 for the presentation of the 2016-2019 Strategic Plan *Transform 2019* to analysts and investors, with the aim to set the right tone from the top as well as to fully align his interests with those of investors', the Chief Executive Officer announced his proposal to the Board of Directors to apply specific conditions to his own compensation starting from January 1, 2017:

### Chief Executive Officer (fixed compensation)



<sup>1</sup> Mercer 2016, based on the peer group reported in the Section III par.3

- 40% reduction of his fixed pay
- no yearly bonus for 2016 nor for the *Transform 2019* plan horizon. For this period, the only form of variable remuneration will be based on the 2017-2019 Long Term Incentive Plan, tied to Strategic Plan targets
- personal investment of € ~2 m in UniCredit shares<sup>13</sup>
- "Zero severance" arrangement in case of separation from the Bank.

Furthermore, on July 26, 2016 the UniCredit Board of Directors approved a new organizational structure, effective from September 1, 2016, aimed at simplifying the group, establishing a more efficient operational set-up, clarifying roles and responsibilities of senior management and bolstering accountability through shorter reporting and decision making lines.

In this context, all business related activities across the group are under the responsibility of Gianni Franco Papa, previously Deputy General Manager of UniCredit and Head of the Corporate and Investment Banking division, who has taken up an expanded and strengthened General Manager role.

With reference to 2016, the General Manager received a total fixed remuneration of € 1.2 m, of which € 0.4 m pro-rated, referring to General Manager position. Consistent with the resolution of the Board of Directors on March 13, 2017, he did not receive any variable remuneration for 2016.

<sup>13</sup>. Executed on March 14, 2017, together with additional purchase of UniCredit bonds equal to € 2m - nominal value



## 1.12 Ex ante disclosure of 2017-2019 goals for Chief Executive Officer and General Manager

For the whole time horizon of the Strategic Plan *Transform 2019*, the variable remuneration for the group Chief Executive Officer and the General Manager is covered by the 2017-2019 Long Term Incentive Plan, tied to Strategic Plan targets and overall aligned to the Risk Appetite Framework. The related performance scorecard is shown below:

	KPI	Perimeter	Weight	Target <i>Transform 2019</i>	Assessment criteria	
					Threshold	Payout
Value creation	ROAC	Group	50%	9%	≥ 9%	100%
					8% - 9%	0% - 100% <sup>2</sup>
					< 8%	0%
Industrial sustainability	Cost/Income ratio	Group	25%	52%	≤ 52%	100%
					55% - 52%	0% - 100% <sup>2</sup>
					> 55%	0%
Risk	NET <sup>1</sup> NPE	Group	25%	20.2 bn	≤ 20.2 bn	100%
					22 - 20.2 bn	0% - 100% <sup>2</sup>
					> 22 bn	0%

<sup>1</sup> Net Non Performing Exposure (after provisions)  
<sup>2</sup> Linear progression (eg. 50% payout for ROAC at 8.5%)



## Section II

# Group Compensation Policy

## 1. Introduction

## 2. Governance

- 2.1 Role of the Remuneration Committee
- 2.2 Market Benchmark
- 2.3 Definition of the Group Compensation Policy
- 2.4 Role of the Compliance Function
- 2.5 Role of the Risk Management Function
- 2.6 Role of the Internal Audit Function
- 2.7 Identified Staff identification process

## 3. Fundamentals

- 3.1 Ratio between variable and fixed compensation
- 3.2 Sustainability of the variable compensation
  - 3.2.1 Definition of performance targets
  - 3.2.2 Performance appraisal
  - 3.2.3 Payment of the variable compensation
- 3.3 Severance
- 3.4 Non-standard compensation
- 3.5 Share ownership guidelines
- 3.6 Compliance drivers

## 4. Compensation structure

- 4.1 Fixed compensation
- 4.2 Variable compensation
  - 4.2.1 Short Term Incentive Systems
  - 4.2.2 Long Term Incentive Systems
- 4.3 Benefits

# 1. Introduction

*Our set of values is based on integrity as a sustainable condition to transform profit into value for our stakeholders.*

By upholding the standards of sustainability behaviors and values which drive our group mission, compensation strategy represents a key enabler to enhance and protect our reputation and to create long-term value for all group stakeholders.


Through appropriate compensation mechanisms, we aim to create a work environment which is comprehensive in its diversity, fostering and unlocking individual potential in order to attract, retain and motivate a highly qualified global workforce capable of creating a competitive advantage. We also aim to reward those who reflect our standards of ethical behavior in the conducting business in a sustainable way.

Relying on our governance model, our Group Compensation Policy sets the framework for a coherent and consistent design, implementation and

monitoring of compensation practices across the entire group.

Within this common policy framework, guidelines are defined to implement compensation programs and plans that reinforce sound risk management policies and our long-term strategy. In doing so, we effectively meet the specific and evolving needs of our different businesses, market contexts and employee populations while ensuring that business and people strategies are always appropriately aligned with our remuneration approach.

To ensure the competitiveness and effectiveness of remuneration as well as transparency and internal equity, the principles of sustainable conduct and performance define the key pillars of our Group Compensation Policy:



*Our compensation governance model aims to assure clarity and reliability of remuneration decisional processes by controlling group-wide remuneration practices and ensuring that decisions are made in an independent, informed and timely manner at appropriate levels, avoiding conflicts of interest and guaranteeing appropriate disclosure in full respect of the general principles defined by regulators.*

## 2.1 Role of the Remuneration Committee

The Board of Directors has established a “Delegation of Powers” system to appropriately regulate effective decision-making processes throughout the organization.

In particular, the Remuneration Committee is entrusted with the role of providing advice, opinions and proposals submitted to the Board of Directors with regard to the group remuneration strategy, Group Risk and Group Compliance functions offer the Remuneration Committee support in its role, as well as an independent external advisor, where deemed important and appropriate (e.g. regarding the remuneration policy for corporate officers - members of the Board of Directors, Board of Statutory Auditors and of Supervisory Board of group Companies).

The main topics discussed by the Committee are also submitted to the attention of the Board of Statutory Auditors, in advance over their submission to the Board of Directors.

The Remuneration Committee, instituted in 2000, consists of 5 non-executive members, the majority of whom are independent. The Chairman of the Remuneration Committee is chosen among independent members. The Chairman of the Board of Directors is a member by right.

## 2.2 Market Benchmark

At group level, we analyze the overall compensation trends of the market through a continuous benchmarking activity (comparison), in order to make informed decisions about our compensation approach and to adopt competitive reward structures for effective retention and motivation of our critical resources.

With specific reference to the group Executive population, an independent external advisor supports the definition of a list of selected competitors that represent our international group-level peers (peer group) with regards to whom compensation benchmarking analysis is performed on market trends, practices and compensation levels.

• The peer group is defined by the Remuneration Committee considering our main European competitors in terms of market capitalization, total assets, business scope and dimension.

At country/division level and as appropriate throughout the organization, benchmarking and trends analysis may be conducted considering relevant peer groups to assure competitive alignment with the market of reference.

## 2.3 Definition of the Group Compensation Policy

On an annual basis, the Group Compensation Policy, as proposed by the Remuneration Committee, is defined by the Board of Directors, and then presented to the shareholders' Annual General Meeting for approval, in line with regulatory requirements.

In particular, the Group Compensation Policy is drawn up by the Group HR function with the involvement of the Group Risk function and is validated by the Group Compliance function for all compliance-related aspects, before being submitted to the Remuneration Committee.

Once approved at the UniCredit Annual General Meeting, the Policy is formally adopted by competent bodies in the relevant Legal Entities across the group<sup>1</sup>, in accordance with applicable local legal and regulatory requirements.

The principles of the Group Compensation Policy

apply across the entire organization and shall be reflected in all remuneration practices applying to all employee categories across all businesses, including staff belonging to external distribution networks, considering their remuneration specifics.

With specific reference to Identified Staff, Group HR function establishes guidelines and coordinates a centralized and consistent management of compensation and incentive systems. Regarding other employees, as relevant and appropriate for each category, division, competence line and country are accountable for compliance to the Group Policy.

## 2.4 Role of the Compliance Function

The Compliance function operates in close co-ordination with the Human Resources function, in order to support the design and the definition of compensation policy and processes and to evaluate them for the profiles in scope.

In particular, Compliance function (through its structures) evaluates, for all aspects that fall within its perimeter, the Group Compensation Policy and, referring to local Regulations, the incentive systems for group personnel as drawn up by HR function. It provides input, as far as it is concerned, for the design – by HR functions – of compliant incentive systems.

The Group Incentive System for Identified Staff is defined by Group Human Resources function, with the involvement and collaboration of Group Risk Management and Finance functions, for the overall qualitative assessment of economic sustainability and of risk, and Compliance function. This is to ensure consistency with the goal of complying with regulations, articles of association and any other code of ethics or other standards of conduct applicable to the bank, so that legal and reputational risks mostly embedded in the relationship with customers are duly contained (ref. Bank of Italy).

Compliance function is also involved in the assessment process for the definition of the group's Identified Staff population, for all compliance-related aspects. In accordance with the regulatory framework and our

governance, the guidelines for the definition of the incentive systems for non-Identified Staff population are arranged by Group HR function, in collaboration with Group Compliance function. At local level, the HR structures define the detailed features of incentive systems and submit them to the reference Compliance structures.

## 2.5 Role of the Risk Management Function

UniCredit ensures the alignment between remuneration and risk through policies that support risk management, rigorous governance processes based on informed decisions taken by corporate bodies and the definition of compensation plans that include the strategic risk appetite defined by the Risk Appetite Framework, the time horizon and individual behaviors.

The Risk Management function is constantly involved in the definition of the remuneration policy, incentive system and compensation processes, in the identification of objectives, for the performance appraisal as well as for the assessment process to define the group's Identified Staff population. This involvement implies explicit link between the group incentive mechanisms, selected metrics of the Risk Appetite Framework, the validation of performance and pay, so that the assumption of risk is properly bound to incentives related to risk management.

<sup>1</sup> Pioneer and Bank Pekao adopt compensation policies in line with relevant sector legislation

## 2.6 Role of the Internal Audit Function

As part of the remuneration system governance process, the Internal Audit function annually assesses the implementation of remuneration policies and practices and performs checks on data and processes. The function assesses compensation practices, providing recommendations aimed at improving the overall process and bringing to the attention of the relevant bodies any weaknesses, for the adoption of corrective measures.

## 2.7 Identified Staff identification process

Identified Staff population (i.e. those categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on an institution's risk profile) is yearly defined on the basis of a structured and formalized assessment process both at group and local level, according to the regulatory requirements defined by CRD IV and the application of qualitative and quantitative criteria set by Regulatory Technical Standards issued by EBA. This process is internally defined through specific guidelines issued by Group HR function, with the involvement of Group Risk Management and Group Compliance, in order to guarantee a common standard approach at group level.

# 3. Fundamentals



## 3.1 Ratio between variable and fixed compensation

In compliance with applicable regulations, the adoption of a maximum ratio between variable and fixed remuneration of 2:1<sup>1</sup> has not changed - for the personnel belonging to the business functions.

For the rest of the staff, a maximum ratio between the components of remuneration equal to 1:1 is usually adopted, except for the staff who are Company Control Functions<sup>2</sup>, for which it is expected that the fixed remuneration is a predominant component of total remuneration and incentive mechanisms are consistent with the assigned tasks as well as independent of results from areas under their control. For these functions, in particular, the maximum weight of the variable component will take into account the differences between national rules and regulations in application of Directive 2013/36 / EU in the various countries in which the group operates<sup>3</sup>. This helps to ensure equal operating conditions in the market and the ability to attract and retain individuals with professionalism and capacity adapted to the needs of the group.

The Holding Company provides specific guidelines to the Legal Entities about the application of the ratio between variable and fixed remuneration for different segments of the population.

The adoption of a ratio of 2:1 between variable and fixed compensation must not have any implication on bank's capacity to continue to respect all prudential rules, in particular capital requirements.



## 3.2 Sustainability of the variable compensation

Performance is evaluated in terms of risk-adjusted profitability and risk-weighted systems and mechanisms are provided.

Incentive systems must not in any way induce risk-taking behaviors in excess of the group's strategic risk appetite; in particular they should be coherent to the Risk Appetite Framework ("RAF").

### 3.2.1 Definition of performance targets

- Consider the customer as the central focus of our Mission, placing customer satisfaction in the forefront of all incentive systems, at all levels, both internally and externally
- design forward-looking incentive plans which balance internal key value driver achievement with external measures of value creation relative to the market
- use both absolute and relative performance achievement metrics as appropriate and relevant, where relative performance measures are based on comparison of achieved results to those of market peers
- consider performance on the basis of annual achievements and their impact over time
- include reflection of the impact of individual's/ business units' return on the overall value of related business groups and organization as a whole
- maintain an adequate mix of financial goals with non-financial (quantitative and qualitative) objectives, considering also other performance measures as appropriate, for example risk management, adherence to group values or other behaviors

- it is crucial to avoid measures linked to economic results for Company Control Functions (Internal Audit, Risk Management<sup>4</sup>, Compliance, and HR)
- the approach for Company Control Functions is also recommended where possible conflicts may arise due to the function's activities. In particular, this is the case of functions (if any) performing only control activities pursuant to internal/external regulations such as some structures in Accounting/ Tax structures<sup>5</sup>
- assure independence between front and back office functions in order to guarantee the effectiveness of cross-checks and avoid conflict of interest, with a particular focus on trading activities, as well as ensuring the appropriate independence levels for the functions performing control activities
- an appropriate mix between short and long-term variable compensation is set, as applicable, and relevant on the basis of market and business specifics and line of sight, and in line with group long term interests.

### 3.2.2 Performance appraisal

- Base performance evaluation upon profitability, financial solidity and sustainability, and other drivers of sustainable business practice with particular reference to risk, cost of capital and efficiency
- design flexible incentive systems such as to manage payout levels in consideration of overall group, country/division performance results and individual achievements, adopting a meritocratic approach to selective performance-based reward
- design incentive systems to set minimum performance thresholds below which zero bonus will be paid. In order to maintain the adequate independence levels for Company Control Functions provide a maximum threshold for the progressive reduction of the bonus pool, which

can be phased out to zero only in presence of exceptionally negative situations with an approval process including a governance step in the Board of Directors

- guarantee that evaluations and appraisals linked to compensation are, as far as possible, available for the scrutiny of independent checks and controls
- evaluate all incentive systems, programs and plans taking into consideration how they enhance our overall company reputation.

<sup>1</sup> As resolved by the Annual General Meeting on May 13, 2014 in line with regulatory requirements

<sup>2</sup> Meaning Internal Audit, Risk Management, Compliance and Human Resources functions. Human Resources function is considered Company Control Function, as far as remuneration and incentive policies and practices are concerned, pursuant to Bank of Italy Circular nr. 285 of December 17, 2013

<sup>3</sup> In particular, for the Identified Staff of Italian Company Control Functions, the ratio between the variable and the fixed components of remuneration cannot exceed the limit of one third, as per BankIT provision (Circolare n. 285 del December 17, 2013).

<sup>4</sup> Where CRO roles cover both Underwriting and Risk Management functions, goals assigned must not represent a source of conflict of interest between Risk Management and Underwriting activities

<sup>5</sup> Where CFO roles cover also Financial Statements preparation, possible economic measures have to be chosen in a conflict-avoidance perspective

### 3.2.3 Payment of the variable compensation

- As foreseen by regulatory requirements, defer performance-based incentive payout to coincide with the risk timeframe of such performance by subjecting the payout of any deferred component until actual sustainable performance has been demonstrated and maintained over the deferral timeframe, so that the variable remuneration takes into account the time trend of the risks assumed by the bank (i.e. malus mechanisms)
- consider claw-back actions as legally enforceable on any performance-based incentive paid out on the basis of a pretext subsequently proven to be erroneous
- include clauses for zero bonus in circumstances of non-compliant behavior or qualified disciplinary action, subjecting payout to the absence of any proceeding undertaken by the company for irregular activities or misconduct of the employee with particular reference to risk underwriting, sales processes of banking and financial products and services, internal code of conduct or values breach
- employees are required to undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration and liability-related insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements.

#### FOCUS Claw-back

The group reserves the right to activate claw-back mechanisms, namely the return of any form of variable compensation already paid (both the immediate and deferred element, to the extent of 100% of the amount awarded) within, generally, the deferral and retention period applied to the payment structure of the variable award, unless different provisions by local regulations or more restrictive provisions are in force. This applies in the case of verification of behaviors adopted in the reference period (performance period), for which the employee<sup>6</sup>:

- contributed with fraudulent behavior or gross negligence to the group incurring significant financial losses, or by his/her conduct had a negative impact on the risk profile or on other regulatory requirements at group or country/division level,
- engaged in misconduct and/or fails to take expected actions which contributed to significant reputational harm to the group or to the country/division, or which were subject to disciplinary measures by the Authority,
- is the subject of disciplinary measures and initiatives envisaged in respect of fraudulent behavior or characterized by gross negligence during the reference period,
- infringed the requirements set out by articles 26 TUB and 53 TUB, where applicable, or the obligations regarding the remuneration and incentive system.

For Executive Directors and Executives with strategic responsibilities specific contractual provisions are envisaged, that allow the Company to ask to return, partially or totally, variable remuneration components (or retain deferred amounts), defined according to data proved to be wrong at a later time.

The claw-back mechanisms can be activated also after the employee's contract termination and/or the end of the appointment and take into account the relative legal, contribution and fiscal profiles and the time limits prescribed by local regulations and applicable practices.



## 3.3 Severance

According to the regulatory requirements issued by Bank of Italy in “*Disposizioni di vigilanza per le banche*” (Circular n.285 of December 17, 2013, 7th update of November 18, 2014), a specific Policy on payments to be agreed in case of early termination of a contract (so called Severance Policy) was submitted for approval to the 2015 Annual General Meeting.

An update of the same policy with more restrictive provisions, is submitted to the approval of the 2017 Annual General Meeting.

For details on criteria, limits and authorization processes, please refer to the above mentioned Policy.

Generally speaking, the calculation of any severance payment takes into consideration the long-term performance in terms of shareholder added-value, as well as any local legal requirements, collective/individual contractual provisions, and any individual circumstances, including the reason for termination.

According to the revision of the *Severance Policy* proposed to the 2017 Annual General Meeting, severance payments, inclusive of notice, do not exceed 24 months of total compensation, defined as the average of the incentives actually received during the last three years prior to the termination, after the application of malus and claw-back, if any. It is also foreseen that the amount of the payments additional to notice cannot exceed 18 months of compensation. In any case, the termination payments, which consider also the duration of the employment, do not exceed the limits foreseen by the laws and collective labor agreements locally applicable in case of lay-off.

As a rule, discretionary pension benefits are not granted and, in any case, even if they might be provided in the context of local practices and/or, exceptionally, within individual agreements, they would be paid consistently with the specific and applicable laws and regulations.

Individual contracts should not contain clauses envisaging the payment of indemnities, or the right to keep post-retirement benefits, in the event of resignations or dismissal/revocation without just cause or if the employment relationship is terminated following a public purchase offer. In case of early termination of the mandate, the ordinary law provisions would therefore apply.



## 3.4 Non-standard compensation

Non-standard compensation are those compensation elements considered as exceptions (e.g. welcome bonus, guaranteed bonus, special award, retention bonus, allowances).

Such awards are limited only to specific situations, as appropriate, to hiring phases, launch of special projects, achievement of extraordinary results, and high risk of leaving for group Executives and mission critical roles.

Moreover, awards must in any case be in accordance with regulations in force from time to time (e.g. cap on the ratio between variable and fixed remuneration; clear identification of fixed and variable components, in line with relevant regulation, technical features fixed by regulation for bonus payout, if applicable) and subject to UniCredit governance processes, periodically monitored and disclosed for regulatory requirements, as well as subject to malus conditions and claw-back actions, as legally enforceable.

<sup>6</sup> Employees and independent contractors, including personal financial advisors



## 3.5 Share ownership guidelines

Share ownership guidelines set minimum levels for company share ownership by relevant Executives<sup>7</sup>, aiming to align managerial interests to those of shareholders by assuring appropriate levels of personal investment in UniCredit shares over time.

As part of our total compensation approach, we offer equity incentives that provide for opportunities of share ownership, in fully alignment with the applicable regulation requirements.


The ownership of UniCredit shares by our group leaders is a meaningful and visible way to show our investors, the public and our people that we believe in our Company.

The Board approved at the end of 2011 the share ownership guidelines applied to the Chief Executive Officer, to General Manager and Deputy General Manager roles, if any.

On March 2017 the Board of Directors of UniCredit approved an update of the above mentioned share ownership guidelines, as reported in the following table, extending their application to Senior Executive Vice President and Executive Vice President positions, taking into consideration the roles that are currently covered<sup>7</sup>.

This has the aim of aligning managerial interests to those of shareholders' for the achievement of the 2016-2019 Strategic Plan *Transform 2019* objectives,

### Share ownership guidelines



<sup>7</sup> Considering the application, from 2016, of the new ratio between the variable and the fixed components of remuneration (which cannot exceed the limit of one third for the Identified Staff within Italian Control Functions, while the fixed remuneration is expected to be the predominant component for the Control Functions of other geographies), share ownership guidelines are not applied to Executives who are part of Company Control Functions

as presented to the market during a Capital Markets Day on December 13, 2016.

The established levels should be reached, as a rule, within 5 years from the appointment to the role within the scope of the guidelines and should be maintained until the role is held.

The achievement of the share ownership levels should be accomplished through a linear pro-rata approach over a 5 year period, granting the minimum amount of shares each year, taking into consideration potential vested plans.

Involved Executives are also expected to refrain from entering into schemes or arrangements that specifically protect the unvested value of equity granted under incentive plans (so called "hedging").

Such clauses are contained in all relevant incentive plan rules and apply to all beneficiaries, since involvement in such schemes undermines the purpose of the incentive at risk.

Any form of violation of share ownership guidelines as well as any form of hedging transaction shall be considered in breach of group compliance policies with such consequences as provided for under enforceable rules, provisions and procedures.

Local adaptations based on specific regulations and / or business shall be envisaged consistently with our group global approach.



## 3.6 Compliance drivers

To support the design of remuneration and incentive systems, with particular reference to network roles and Governance Functions, the following "compliance drivers" have been defined:

- maintenance of an adequate ratio between economic and non-economic goals (depending on the role, but in general at least one goal should be non-economic)
- qualitative measures must be accompanied by an ex ante indication of objective parameters to be considered in the evaluation, the descriptions of expected performance and the person in charge for the evaluation
- non-economic quantitative measures should be related to an area for which the employee perceives a direct link between her/his performance and the trend of the indicator
- among the non-financial goals (quantitative and qualitative), include, where relevant, goals related to Risk as well as to Compliance (e.g. credit quality, operational risks, application of MIFID principles, products sales quality, respect of the customer, Anti Money Laundering requirements fulfillment)
- set and communicate ex-ante clear and pre-defined parameters as drivers of individual performance
- avoidance of incentives with excessively short timeframes (e.g. less than three months)
- promotion of a customer-centric approach which places customer needs and satisfaction at the forefront and which will not constitute an incentive to sell unsuitable products to clients
- take into account, even in remuneration systems of the external networks (financial advisors), the principles of fairness in relation with customers, management of legal and reputational risks, protection and loyalty of customers, compliance with the provisions of law, regulatory requirements, and applicable self-regulations
- create incentives that are appropriate in avoiding potential conflicts of interest with customers, considering fairness in dealing with customers and the endorsement of appropriate business conduct
- economic goals must be avoided for Company Control Functions<sup>8</sup> and individual goals set for employees in these functions shall reflect primarily the performance of their own function and be independent of results of monitored areas, in order to avoid conflict of interest
- define incentives that are not only based on financial parameters for personnel providing investment services and activities, taking into account the qualitative aspects of the performance; this in order to avoid potential conflicts of interest in the relationship with customers<sup>9</sup>
- the approach for control functions is also recommended where possible conflicts may arise due to function's activities. This is the case in particular of functions of the Company (if any) performing only control activities pursuant to internal/external regulations<sup>10</sup>
- avoidance of incentives on a single product/financial instrument or specific categories of financial instruments, as well as single banking/insurance product

<sup>8</sup> Meaning Internal Audit, Risk Management, Compliance and Human Resources functions. Human Resources function is considered Company Control Function, as far as remuneration and incentive policies and practices are concerned, pursuant to Bank of Italy Circular nr. 285 of December 17, 2013. Where CRO roles cover both Underwriting and Risk Management functions, goals assigned must not represent a source of conflict of interest between Risk Management and Underwriting activities

<sup>9</sup> As for example: ESMA requirements, with reference to MIFID remuneration policies and practices; Technical Advice ESMA on MiFid II (Final Report 2014/1569); MIFID II specific articles regarding remuneration/incentives for relevant subjects

<sup>10</sup> E.g. Accounting/Tax structures. Where CFO roles cover also Financial Statements preparation, possible economic measures have to be chosen in a conflict-avoidance perspective

- for the purpose of granting incentives, any disciplinary sanctions and/or sanctions by regulatory authorities imposed on the resource must be taken into account. In the presence of these measures, the possible allocation of the incentive will require a written explanation, which will make a case-by-case verification of the managerial decisions possible
- for Commercial Network Roles, goals shall be defined including drivers on quality/riskiness/sustainability of the products sold, in line with client risk profile. Particular attention shall be paid to the provision of non-economic goals for customer facing roles selling products covered by MiFID. For these Employees, incentives must be set in order to avoid potential conflict of interest with customers
- all rewarding system communication and reporting phases shall clearly indicate that the final evaluation of the Employee achievements will also rely, according to local requirements on qualitative criteria such as:
  - compliance to external (i.e. laws/regulations) and internal rules (i.e. policies);
  - mandatory training completion;
  - existence of disciplinary procedures officially activated and/or disciplinary sanctions actually applied
- maintenance of adequate balance of fixed and variable compensation elements also with due regard to the role and the nature of the business performed. The fixed portion is maintained sufficiently high in order to allow the variable part to decrease, and in some extreme cases to drop down to zero
- the entire evaluation process must be conveniently put in writing and documented
- in cases where individual performance evaluation systems are fully or partially focused on a managerial discretionary approach, the evaluation parameters should be defined ex-ante. These parameters should be clear and documented to the manager in due time for the evaluation period. Such parameters should reflect all applicable regulation requirements<sup>11</sup> (including the balance between quantitative and qualitative parameters). The results of managerial discretionary evaluation should be formalized for the adequate and predefined monitoring process by the proper functions and an appropriate repository should be created and maintained (e.g. of inspections/request from the Authorities).

<sup>11</sup> Also in line with the regulation references reported in the previous notes

### COMMERCIAL CAMPAIGNS

Within network roles incentive systems, particular attention is paid to 'Commercial Campaigns'.

Such Campaigns may be organized after the evaluation and authorization of the competent Product Committee. They represent business actions aimed at providing guidance to the sales network towards the achievement of the period's commercial targets (also intermediate, for instance on a half-year basis) and with a direct impact on the budget and related incentive systems.

Among the distinctive features of commercial campaigns, there is the expectation of the award - in cash or non-monetary reward. Commercial Campaigns can also help the function to accelerate the achievement of certain objectives of the incentive system. The grant of awards related to a Campaign will be subordinated to behaviours compliant with the external and internal regulations.

Under no circumstances may the system of remuneration and evaluation of the sales network employees constitute an incentive to sell products unsuitable to the financial needs of the clients.

In particular the following "compliance drivers" have been defined:

- setting-up of the incentive mechanisms using criteria which are consistent with the best interest

of the client, and which avoid in any case conditions of potential conflicts of interest with customers, and coherently with relevant regulatory provisions (e.g. MiFID)

- ensuring consistency between a Campaign's objectives with the objectives set when defining the budget and when assigning targets to the sales network
- avoidance of Commercial campaigns on a single financial or banking product/financial instrument
- inclusion of clauses for zero bonus payment in case of relevant non-compliant behavior or qualifying disciplinary actions
- avoidance of campaigns which – not being grounded on objective and customer interests related basis – may directly or indirectly lead to breaching the rules of conduct regarding clients
- avoidance of campaigns lacking a clear indication of the targets and of the maximum level of incentive to be granted for achieving those targets
- avoidance, in general, of campaigns that link incentives not only to the targets assigned to specific roles/structures (e.g. advisors, agencies) but also to higher hierarchical levels or to the budget of the higher territorial structure.

# 4. Compensation structure

Within the framework provided by the “Group Compensation Policy”, UniCredit is committed to ensure fair treatment in terms of compensation and benefits regardless of age, race, culture, gender, disability, sexual orientation, religion, political belief and marital status.

Our total compensation approach provides for a balanced package of fixed and variable, monetary and non-monetary elements, each designed to impact in a specific manner the motivation and retention of employees.

In line with the applicable regulations, particular attention is paid to avoid incentive elements in variable compensation which may induce behaviors not aligned with the company’s sustainable business results and risk appetite.

As policy target, Identified Staff fixed compensation<sup>1</sup> is set on the market median as reference, with individual positioning being defined on the basis of specific performance, potential and people strategy decisions, as well as UniCredit performance over time.

With particular reference to the group Executive population, the Board of Directors, on the basis of the proposal of Remuneration Committee, establishes the compensation structure for top positions, defining the mix of fixed and variable compensation elements, consistent with market trends and internal analysis performed.

Moreover, the Board of Directors annually approves the criteria and features of the incentive plans for Identified Staff, ensuring the appropriate balance of variable reward opportunities within the pay-mix structure.

For non-executive directors and members of the auditing bodies, in line with the statutory and regulatory provisions, any incentive mechanism based on stock options or, generally, based on financial instruments is avoided. The remuneration for these directors and members is represented only by a fixed component, determined on the basis of the importance of the role, of any additional assignments and commitment required to perform the tasks. Remuneration is not linked to the economic results achieved at group and/or country/division level.

As required by the “*Disposizioni di Vigilanza*”, the level of remuneration for the Chairman doesn’t exceed the fixed component of the one received by the Chief Executive Officer.

The remuneration policy for members of corporate bodies of the group Legal Entities is based on the same principles, consistently with the local statutory and regulatory requirements.



## 4.1 Fixed compensation

### > Definition

The Base Salary remunerates the role covered and the scope of responsibilities, reflecting the experience and skills required for each position, as well as the level of excellence demonstrated and the overall quality of the contribution to business results.

### > Objective

Base salary is appropriate in the specific market for the business in which an individual works and for the talents, skills and competencies that the individual brings to the group.

The relevance of fixed compensation weight is sufficient to reward the activity rendered even if the variable part of the remuneration package were not paid due to non-achievement of performance goals such as to reduce the risk of excessively risk-oriented behaviors, discourage initiatives focused on short-term results and allow a flexible bonus approach.

### > Features

Specific pay-mix guidelines for the weight of fixed versus variable compensation are defined with respect to each target employee population. With particular reference to the group Executive population, the Remuneration Committee establishes:

- the criteria and guidelines to perform market benchmarking analysis for each position in terms of compensation levels and pay-mix structure, including the definition of specific peer groups at group, country/divisional level and the list of preferred external “executive compensation providers”
- the positioning of compensation, in line with the relevant market’s competitive levels, defining operational guidelines to perform single compensation reviews as necessary.

<sup>1</sup> Taking into consideration the differences between national rules and regulations – also in application of Directive 2013/36 / EU - in terms of maximum incidence of the variable component, the individual positioning can take into account the total compensation



## 4.2 Variable compensation

### > Definition

The variable compensation includes payments depending on performance, independently of how it is measured (profitability/revenues/other goals) or on other parameters (e.g. length of service).

### > Objective

Variable compensation aims to remunerate achievements by directly linking pay to performance outcomes in the short, medium and long term. This is then risk adjusted. To strengthen the alignment of shareholders' interest and the interests of management and employees, performance measurement reflects the actual results of the Company overall, the business unit of reference and the individual. As such, variable compensation constitutes a mechanism of meritocratic differentiation and selectivity.

### > Features

Adequate range and managerial flexibility in performance-based payouts are an inherent characteristic of well-managed, accountable and sustainable variable compensation, which may be awarded via mechanisms differing by time horizon and typology of reward.

Incentives remunerate the achievement of performance objectives, both quantitative and qualitative, by providing a variable bonus payment. An appropriately balanced performance-based compensation element is encouraged for all employee categories as a key driver of motivation and alignment with organizational goals, and is set as a policy requirement for all business roles. The design features, including performance measures and pay mechanisms, must avoid an excessive short-term focus by reflecting the principles of this policy, focusing on parameters linked to profitability and sound risk management, in order to guarantee sustainable performance in the medium and long term. In alignment with our overall mission, the characteristics of incentive systems also reflect the requirements of specialized businesses.

More details on the design of remuneration and incentive systems, with particular reference to network roles and governance functions, are reported in the section "Compliance Drivers".

With particular reference to trading roles and activities, organizational governance and processes as well as risk-management practices provide the structure for a compliant and sound approach, whereby levels of risk assumed are defined (using specific indicators, e.g. Value at Risk) and monitored centrally by the relevant group functions. This structure reinforces our consistent remuneration approach which adopts performance measures based on profitability rather than revenues, and risk-adjusted rather than absolute indicators.

#### FOCUS

Group common guidelines on the key elements of Executive contracts ensure alignment with regulatory requirements and also with Internal Audit recommendations, in particular regarding contract elements with specific regulatory provisions, such as variable compensation and severance provisions.

Group guidelines provide for the eligibility to variable compensation to be mentioned in the Executive contracts. Amounts related to variable pay and any technical details of payments (vehicles used, payment structure, and time schedule) are included in separate communication and are managed in strict adherence to governance and delegation of authority rules.

### 4.2.1 Short Term Incentive Systems (STI)

Short term incentive systems aim to attract, motivate and retain strategic resources and maintain full alignment with the latest national and international regulatory requirements and with best market practices.

Payout is based on a bonus pool approach providing for a comprehensive performance measurement at individual and at group/country/division level.

Reward is directly linked to performance, which is evaluated on the basis of results achieved and on the alignment with our leadership model and values.

The Executive Development Plan (EDP) as the group-wide framework for Identified Staff performance management is a cornerstone of fair and coherent appraisal across the organization.

The payout is phased to coincide with an appropriate risk time horizon. The design features of incentive plans for Identified Staff are aligned with shareholder interests and long-term, firm-wide profitability, providing for an appropriate allocation of a performance related incentive in cash and in shares, upfront and deferred.

Each year, detailed information about our compensation governance, key figures and the features of group incentive systems is fully disclosed in the Annual Compensation Report.

### 4.2.2 Long Term Incentive Systems (LTI)

Long Term Incentive Plans aim to strengthen the link between variable compensation and Company results and further align the interests of senior management and shareholders.

The Plan provides for:

- the allocation – subject to the achievement of specific performance conditions – for future incentives based on shares or other instruments reflecting the trend of the share
- a performance period aligned with UniCredit strategic targets
- performance conditions based on a comprehensive scorecard including, for example, financial and sustainability targets plus an overarching board assessment
- multi-year deferral with the application of a cumulated Zero factor condition, which provides for minimum requirements related to profitability, liquidity and capital
- the application of an holding period of the actual awards after the deferral period
- awards subject to claw-back conditions, as legally enforceable.



## 4.3 Benefits

### > Definition

Benefits include welfare benefits that are supplementary to social security plans, healthcare and life balance benefits and are intended to provide substantial guarantees for the well-being of staff and their family members during their active career as well as retirement.

In addition, special terms and conditions of access to various banking products and other services may be offered to employees in order to support them during different stages of their lives.

### > Objective

From a total compensation perspective, benefits aim to reflect internal equity and overall coherence of our remuneration systems, meeting the needs of different categories as appropriate and relevant.

### > Features

In coherence with our governance framework and Global Job Model, benefits are aligned applying general common criteria for each employee category, while benefits plans are established on the basis of local regulations and practices.

UniCredit affirms the value of share ownership as a valuable tool for enabling the engagement, affiliation and alignment of interests among shareholders, management and the overall employee population. The Employee Share Ownership Plan rewards the continuous support and commitment of our people who can contribute to our success with day by day decisions, actions and behaviors. The possibility is therefore considered, from time to time and as appropriate in light of local legal and tax requirements, to offer employees the opportunity to invest and participate in the future achievements of the group through share-based plans whereby employees can purchase UniCredit shares at favorable conditions.

Section III

# Annual Compensation Report

- 1. Introduction**
- 2. Governance and Compliance**
  - 2.1 Remuneration Committee
  - 2.2 The Role of Company Control Functions: Compliance, Risk Management and Audit
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  - 5.1 Target Population
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# 1. Introduction

The Annual Compensation Report discloses all relevant group compensation-related information and methodologies with the aim of increasing stakeholders' awareness of our compensation policies, practices and outcomes, demonstrating their coherence with business strategy and performance, responsible remuneration and sound risk management.

The report provides ex post information on 2016 outcomes, as well as ex ante disclosure for the 2017 approach, covering both our Identified Staff population and corporate bodies' members. Remuneration solutions implemented in 2016 provided for:

- compliance of incentive structures with all relevant regulations, including deferred and equity incentives based on financial instruments
- comprehensive performance measurement to foster sound behaviours aligned with different types of risk

Over the year we constantly remained abreast of ongoing changes in national and international regulations, both in Italy and in other countries where the group operates. Among most recent innovations in the regulatory framework, the following is a highlight: on January 1, 2014 the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) was implemented, providing a cap on variable remuneration for Identified Staff and requesting local regulators to issue regulations for local implementation; the European Banking Authority (EBA) published on December 16, 2013 the Regulatory Technical Standards, qualitative and quantitative criteria which are common at European level to define Identified Staff population. To introduce CRD IV requisites, Bank of Italy issued on November 18, 2014 the final regulations which replace the "Disposizioni in materia di politiche e prassi di remunerazione e incentivazione nelle banche e nei gruppi bancari" issued in 2011. Finally it should be noted that on December 21, 2015 EBA published the consultation document "Guidelines on sound remuneration policy"<sup>1</sup>. Such guidelines are applied starting from January 1, 2017.

In 2016 we participated in the European Banking Authority's ("EBA") remuneration benchmarking exercise and data collection of high earners, reporting through Bank of Italy information regarding remuneration for 2015 of all staff and Identified Staff, including the number of individuals in pay brackets of at least €1 million.

In 2016 and in the first months of 2017 we continued our annual structured dialogue with international investors and proxy advisors, receiving valuable feedback on our compensation approach and specific inputs for an effective compensation disclosure, considering Italian specifics and international standards.

Furthermore, on December 13, 2016, in connection with our 2016-2019 Strategic Plan *Transform 2019* presented to analysts and investors at a Capital Markets Day in London, the CEO Jean Pierre Mustier explained the review of our compensation framework and his personal undertakings (for details see Focus "2016- 2019 Strategic Plan *Transform 2019*").

The Annual Report, a document providing complete and comprehensive information on compensation, includes also this year details referring to Members of Administrative and Auditing bodies, General Managers and Executives with strategic responsibilities. In particular, data pursuant sect. 84-quarter Consob Issuers Regulation Nr. 11971, Compensation report – Section II, as well as the information on incentive systems under 114-bis<sup>2</sup> are included in the attachments to the 2017 Group Compensation Policy, published on UniCredit website, in the [section dedicated to 2017 Shareholders' Meeting](#).



## 2016-2019 Strategic Plan *Transform 2019*

A simple Pan European Commercial Bank, delivering unique Western, Central and Eastern European network to its extensive client franchise

Taking decisive action on legacy issues, transformig the Bank and buildings on existing competitive advantages to capture opportunities and to achieve future recurring profitability

On December 13, 2016, the Board of Directors of UniCredit S.p.A approved the 2016-2019 Strategic Plan, *Transform 2019*, which, on the same date, was presented to analysts and investors at a Capital Markets Day in London.

The strategic review, launched in July 2016 and led by the new CEO Jean Pierre Mustier, encompassed all major areas of the Bank with specific focus on how to reinforce and optimize the group's capital position, reduce balance sheet risk profile, improve profitability, ensure continuous transformation of operations to allow additional cost reduction and cross selling across group entities, whilst maintaining flexibility to seize value creating opportunities, as well as further improved risk discipline.

The *Transform 2019* Plan targets are pragmatic, tangible and achievable and are based on conservative assumptions resting on five well-defined strategic pillars:

- **Strengthen and optimize capital**, to align capital ratios with the best in class G-SIFIs

- **Improve the asset quality**, decisive actions to address the Italian legacies via a proactive balance sheet de-risking, an increase of the NPE coverage, and by tightening risk management policies to further improve the quality of new loans origination

- **Transform the operating model**, increase client focus whilst simplifying and streamlining products and services to reduce the cost to serve customers

- **Maximize commercial bank value**, capitalize on Retail client relationship potential and the "go to" bank status for Corporate clients in Western Europe, further strengthen the leadership position in Central and Eastern Europe and enhance cross selling across business lines and countries

- **Adopt a lean but strong steering Group Corporate Center**, consistent group-wide KPIs to drive performance, ensure accountability, leaner support functions and transparent cost allocation.

The KPIs aligned with Risk Appetite Framework are cascaded down to divisions:



<sup>1</sup> Guidelines on sound remuneration policies under Article 74(3) and 75(2) of Directive 2013/36/EU and disclosures under Article 450 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013

<sup>2</sup> Legislative decree no. 58 of February 24, 1998 as well as to the provisions of the issuer "Regulations" adopted by CONSOB with resolution no. 11971 of May 14, 1999 regarding the information to be disclosed to the market in relation to the granting of awarding plans based on financial instruments

KPIs	Rationale
Value creation ROAC	Business profitability including all P&L items
Risk & capital governance CET1 ratio fully loaded New business EL <sup>1</sup> Performing stock EL <sup>1</sup> Δ Gross NPE yoy Loan and deposit volumes	Focus on capital strength
	Quality of new business
	Risk dynamics of performing credit portfolio
	Development of non-performing credit portfolio
Industrial drivers and clients Δ Opex vs. target Cross-selling Net new clients	Liquidity position
	Cost-efficiency development vs. target
	Cross-sellings effectiveness across business lines and countries
	New client origination, differentiating between active and dormant clients

KPIs CASCADED DOWN TO DIVISIONS

<sup>1</sup> EL stands for Expected Loss

In order to support the Bank strategic review and the alignment of senior management interests to those of shareholders to achieve the targets set by the Plan *Transform 2019*, UniCredit has done an in-depth review of its compensation policies, in line with regulatory prescriptions and based on four principles as reported below.


The key elements of the new compensation framework are the followings:

- change of the compensation policy target, related to fixed remuneration that, for the Identified Staff, is set on the market median as reference
- review of the senior management remuneration, aligning incentive to group long term value creation,

through the new LTI Plan. The bonus pool approach is confirmed for the annual incentive. Furthermore, variable remuneration is tightly linked with the KPIs defined within the Plan *Transform 2019*.

- extension of share ownership guidelines to the first ~120 group senior managers, to align individual portfolios to investors' return
- review of the Termination Policy, by reducing severance limits to 24 months (including notice period) in order to meet investors' expectations and bank's needs.

Considering the efforts requested to group shareholders and employees by the Plan *Transform 2019* and to set the right tone from the top, as well



as to fully align his interests with all stakeholders, the CEO Jean Pierre Mustier has asked the Board of Directors to apply specific conditions to his remuneration effective January 1, 2017:

- 40% reduction of fixed remuneration up to €1.2 million
- no annual bonus during Strategic Plan horizon. Until 2019 variable remuneration is covered by the LTI Plan based on Strategic Plan targets
- personal investment in UniCredit shares equal to €2 m<sup>3</sup>
- zero severance arrangement in case of separation from the bank.

On January 10, 2017 consistently and in line with the announcement made by the CEO Jean Pierre Mustier, the Chairman of the Board of Directors, Mr. Giuseppe Vita, has asked the Board to reduce his remuneration by 40% as of January 1, 2017.

On the same date, in the same spirit, the three Vice Chairmen - Mr. Vincenzo Calandra Buonauro, Mr. Luca Cordero di Montezemolo and Mr. Fabrizio Palenzona - have also asked the Board to reduce their special remuneration pursuant to art. 2389 3rd par. of the Italian Civil Code by 40%, effective January 1, 2017.

On March 1, 2017 Mr. Fabrizio Palenzona advised the Chairman of the Board of Directors that, with immediate effect, he was stepping down from his role as Vice Chairman.

	General policy	CEO's specific undertakings
Target pay	• General repositioning around median of the market (from above median)	• 40% reduction of own fixed pay, to €1.2m
Senior management remuneration	• Executive Management Committee incentives aligned to Group long term value creation, via new equity LTIP • Progressively softer cascading embracing the Top ~120 Group positions	• No yearly bonus for 2016 nor plan horizon • Performance-based LTIP as the only form of variable remuneration till 2019
Shareholding requirements	• Share ownership guidelines extended to Top ~120 Group positions	• Investment of €2m in UniCredit shares
Termination policy	• Reduction of overall severance limits to 24 months <sup>1</sup> (inclusive of notice)	• "Zero severance" arrangement in case of separation from the Bank

<sup>1</sup> Of total compensation defined as the average of the last 3 years fixed salary plus "cashed-in"/vested variable installments

<sup>3</sup> Executed on March 14, 2017, together with additional purchase of UniCredit bonds equal to 2m - nominal value

# 2. Governance and Compliance

## 2.1 Remuneration Committee

### Role of the Remuneration Committee

The Remuneration Committee performs a fundamental role in supporting the Board for the oversight of Group Compensation Policy and for the design of incentive plans. As established in the Board's Charter, the Remuneration Committee consists of 5 non-executive members, the majority of whom are independent in accordance with the Articles of Association. The Chairman of the Board of Directors is a member of the Committee by right. The activities are coordinated by the Chairman, chosen among independent members. The Remuneration Committee is currently composed of independent members: Mr. Alessandro Caltagirone

(Chairman), Mrs. Henryka Bochniarz and Mr. Alexander Wolfgring and of non-executive members Mr. Giuseppe Vita and Mr. Anthony Wyand.

All members of the Committee in its current composition are independent according to the article 148, paragraph 3 of the Decreto Legislativo n.58/98 ('Testo UniCo della Finanza' 'TUF') and the majority of the members (3 out of 5) meet the requirements of independence described in the 'Codice di Autodisciplina' for listed companies ('Codice'), which coincide with the ones given in the Articles of Association.

All members meet the requirements of professionalism, in accordance with current normative and regulatory dispositions. Some members have specific technical know-how on the matters overseen by the Committee, some

in particular have developed experience in the accounting and finance areas. The connection with risk issues is ensured by the presence, in the Remuneration Committee, of three members of the Internal Controls and Risk Committee, including the current Chairman and the previous Chairman of the same Committee.

The Chairman of the Board of Directors is a member of all Board Committees, including the Remuneration Committee. This approach has been evaluated as a sign of sound governance, given that it guarantees that the Chairman is informed in a timely and proper manner on all topics submitted to the Board of Directors.

It is also noted that the Chairman of the Board of Directors has a role of strategic representation within the group and towards the Regulator as well,


with constant and full-time commitment. He does not hold an executive role and has not received any operational delegation of power. His remuneration is set in line with the complexity of the role, reflects the dimensions and the scope of the group and is in line with legal and regulatory provisions.

In the table at the end of the chapter, details on the independence of the members of the Committee are provided, in accordance with the 'Codice' and the Articles of Association, as well as with the art. 148, par. 3, of the 'Decreto Legislativo n.58/98' of 'TUF'.

The main topics discussed by the Committee are also submitted to the attention of the Board of Statutory Auditors, in advance over their submission to the Board of Directors. The meetings of the Committee may be attended by the members of the Statutory Auditors.

### Activities of the Committee in 2016

In 2016 the Remuneration Committee met 10 times. The meetings had an average duration of about one hour. From January 2017 to March 2017, 3 meetings of the Committee have been held and for 2017 it is expected that the Committee will meet 7 times. Each meeting of the Remuneration Committee is placed on record by the Secretary designated by Committee itself. During 2016 the key activities of the Remuneration Committee included:



In 2016 the members of the group's senior management team, and among them - as per Bank of Italy request - the Heads of the Risk (Chief Risk Officer) and Internal Audit, attended Committee meetings with regard to specific issues reported in the table above. Moreover, the Group Head of Human Resources always attended all the meetings as a guest.

The Remuneration Committee had access to all the information and corporate functions as required for performing its duties, and for this purpose relies on the support of the corporate head office structures.

In 2016 the Remuneration Committee has availed itself with the services of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), external independent advisor, who provides advice on compensation practices and trends, as well as up-to-date remuneration benchmarking studies. It has been evaluated in advance that such an advisor is not in any position which might impair its independence.

PwC has collaborated with the Committee since the end of 2015. The representatives of these advisors were regularly invited to attend meetings to discuss specific items on the Committee's agenda.

During the year, the spending requirements of the Committee are met by its own specific budget, which may be supplemented to meet specific needs. In particular in 2016, by means of its budget, the Remuneration Committee was able to get the advice of independent advisors to gather the updated information needed for the decisional processes.

The following table summarizes the composition of the Committee in 2016 and, in addition to the information on the independence of the members, provides details regarding their attendance to the meetings that have been called during the year.

Remuneration committee (year Jan 1, 2016 - Dec 31, 2016)

	Independency according to Code	Not executive	Office covered C= Chairman M= Member	Nr. of meetings attended	% of participation
Alessandro Caltagirone Chairman of the RemCo	✓	✓	C <sup>1</sup>	8	80%
Giuseppe Vita Chairman of the BoD		✓	M <sup>2</sup>	9	90%
Henryka Bochniarz Director	✓	✓	M	9	90%
Alexander Wolfgring Director	✓	✓	M	10	100%
Anthony Wyand Director		✓	M <sup>3</sup>	9	90%

1 Chairman of the Remuneration Committee since May 13, 2015  
2 Chairman of the Remuneration Committee until May 12, 2015  
3 Office held since May 13, 2015

#### FOCUS

Within the scope of its responsibilities, the Remuneration Committee:

- formulates proposals to the Board on remuneration of members of the Board of Directors, the General Manager, Deputy General Managers, the Heads of Company Control Functions and the personnel whose remuneration and incentive systems are decided upon by the Board
- with regard to the CEO's earnings, serves in an advisory capacity in terms of setting the performance targets associated with the variable portion of the CEO's remuneration
- acts in an advisory capacity on setting criteria for remunerating the most significant employees, as identified pursuant to applicable Bank of Italy provisions
- issues opinions to the Board of Directors on the remuneration policy for Senior Executive Vice Presidents, the Executive Vice Presidents and the Senior Vice Presidents
- issues opinions to the Board of Directors on the group incentive schemes based on financial instruments proposed by the Board
- issues opinions to the Board of Directors on the remuneration policy for corporate officers (members of Boards of Directors, Boards of Statutory Auditors and Supervisory Boards) at group companies

- directly supervises the correct application of rules regarding the remuneration of the Heads of internal control functions, working closely with the Board of Statutory Auditors.
- works with the other committees, particularly the Internal Controls and Risks Committee in relation to the tasks assigned to the same with regard to the verification that the incentive contained in the compensation and incentive schemes are consistent to the Risk Appetite Framework (RAF), ensuring the involvement of the corporate functions responsible for drawing up and controlling remuneration and incentive policies and practices
- provides appropriate feedback on its operations to the Board of Directors, Board of Statutory Auditors and the Shareholders' Meeting
- where necessary drawing on information received from relevant corporate functions, expresses an opinion on the achievement of the performance targets associated with incentive schemes, and on the checking of the other conditions set for bonus payments.

No member of the Committee takes part in the meetings during which his/her own remuneration is proposed to the Board of Directors.

## 2.2 The Role of Company Control Functions: Compliance, Risk Management and Audit

Group Compliance function's key contributions in 2016 included:

- validation of the 2016 Group Compensation Policy submitted to the Board of Directors for subsequent approval at the Annual General Meeting on April 14, 2016
- validation of the 2016 Group Incentive System for Identified Staff

- preparation – in collaboration with Human Resources function – and distribution of group guidelines for the development and management of 2016 incentive systems for below Executive population
- participation in specific initiatives of Human Resources function (e.g.: review of KPI Bluebook; review of definition of Identified Staff for the application of Group Incentive System)
- analysis of specific non-standard compensation within the 2016 cycle.

In 2017, the Compliance function will continue to operate in close co-ordination with the Human Resources function to support in the validation and in the design and definition of compensation policy and processes and perform the validation for profiles in scope.

The link between compensation and risk has been maintained also in 2016 with the involvement of the Risk Management function in compensation design and the definition of an explicit framework to base remuneration within an overarching Group Risk Appetite Framework, so that incentives to take risk are appropriately constrained by incentives to

manage risk. In particular, the Board of Directors and Remuneration Committee draw upon the input of involved functions to define the link between profitability, risk and reward within group incentive systems.

#### INTERNAL AUDIT REPORT ON THE 2016 REMUNERATION POLICIES AND PRACTICES

Group Internal Audit performed the annual audit on the group variable remuneration system as requested by Bank of Italy.

The audit aimed at verifying the design, implementation and effects of the remuneration process, as well as its compliance with relevant regulatory requirements and group internal rules. The audit scope included also: Identified Staff definition process, bonus pool definition and distribution process, procedures to respect the variable/fixed remuneration caps, payment and deferral phase of previous year incentive system, assessment of severance and non- standard compensation, as well as a follow-up of previous audit and regulatory inspection recommendations.

Main audit results were presented to the Remuneration Committee on March 9, 2017.

The Internal Audit satisfactory evaluation was based on the overall correct application of the 2016 Group Incentive System and UniCredit Remuneration Committee/Board of Directors relevant decisions.

The assessment performed for defining Identified Staff resulted substantially compliant with regulatory requirements, nonetheless a more homogeneous approach should be followed across the group.

Internal Audit verified the substantial alignment of severances paid in 2016 with the Termination Payments Group Policy and severance guidelines issued in 2015.

## 3. Continuous Monitoring of Market Trends and Practices

Key highlights of total compensation policy defined this year with the support of continuing external benchmarking and trends analysis provided by the independent external advisor to the Remuneration Committee include:

- the definition of Identified Staff compensation policy, with particular reference to the design of the group incentive systems for 2017
- the recommendations on remuneration based on specific benchmarking analysis versus our defined peer group to inform any decision.

During the second part of 2016, the European peer group has been reviewed, defined on grounds of similarity (additional to the market capitalization) in terms of: dimensions, complexity and business model, reference markets with respect to clients, talents and capitals, risk profile and legal, social and economic framework.

The peer group is subject to annual review to assure its continuing relevance.

In particular, Commerzbank and ING have been included in the UniCredit peer group, while Credit Suisse and HSBC have been excluded from the peer group.



#### 2016 Unicredit peer group

- Banco Santander
- Banque Populaire CE
- Barclays
- Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria
- BNP Paribas
- Commerzbank
- Credit Agricole
- Deutsche Bank
- ING
- Intesa Sanpaolo
- Nordea Bank
- Royal Bank of Scotland
- Société Générale
- UBS

# 4. Compensation to Directors, Statutory Auditors and Executives with Strategic Responsibilities

The remuneration for members of the administrative and auditing bodies of UniCredit is represented only by a fixed component, determined on the basis of the importance of the position and the time required for the performance of the tasks assigned. This policy applies to non-Executive Directors as well as Statutory Auditors. The compensation paid to non-Executive Directors and Statutory Auditors is not linked to the economic results achieved by UniCredit and they do not take part in any incentive plans based on stock options or, generally, based on financial instruments.

During 2016, and particularly following the Shareholders' Meeting of April 14, 2016, the amounts paid to the members of the Statutory Auditors, renovated in the same session, were defined.

On June 30, 2016 the Board of Directors of UniCredit unanimously approved the appointment of Jean Pierre Mustier as the group's new Chief Executive Officer starting from July 12, 2016 and replacing Federico Ghizzoni.

On the basis of the decision taken by the UniCredit Board of Directors in the same session of June 30, 2016, the remuneration package for 2016 assigned to the new Group Chief Executive Officer had the same size and structure of the previous CEO's, except for the participation to the 2015-2018 Long Term Incentive Plan approved by the Shareholders' Meeting on May 13, 2015.

Furthermore, on July 26, 2016 the UniCredit Board of Directors approved a new organizational structure, effective on September 1, 2016, aimed at simplifying the group, establishing a more efficient operational set-up, clarifying roles and responsibilities of senior management and bolstering accountability through shorter reporting and decision making lines.

In this context, all business related activities across the group are under the responsibility of Gianni Franco Papa, previously Deputy General Manager of UniCredit and Head of the Corporate and Investment Banking division, who took up an expanded and strengthened General Manager role.

In line with the application of all statutory and regulatory instructions, on the basis of the new organizational structure, the Board of Directors identified the following roles as Executives with strategic responsibilities: Group Chief Executive Officer, Group General Manager, Group Chief Risk Officer, Head of Group Human Capital, Group Compliance Officer, Head of Group Legal, Co- Chief Operating Officers, Head of Strategy, Business, Development & M&A and Head of Internal Audit.

Beneficiary	Remuneration component	Approved by	Amount	Remarks
Non- Executive Directors	Only fixed compensation	Shareholders' Meeting May 13, 2015  Board of Directors of July 9, 2015, pursuant to sect. 2389 of the Civil Code par. 3 and Articles of Association, heard the opinion of Statutory Auditors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• € 2,675,000 of which € 1,110,000 for the participation to Board Committees</li> <li>• € 400 attendance fee for participating to each meeting<sup>1</sup>:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Board of Directors</li> <li>- Board Committees</li> <li>- Other Bank Internal Bodies</li> </ul> </li> <li>• € 2,158,000 for each year of activity, split between:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Board Chairman</li> <li>- Board Vice Chairmen</li> <li>- Chief Executive Officer (executive)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>The compensation is determined on the basis of the importance of the position and the time required for the performance of the tasks assigned.</p> <p>The remuneration is not linked to the economic results achieved by UniCredit, non-executive directors and statutory auditors do not take part in any incentive plans based on stock options or, generally, based on financial instruments</p>
Statutory Auditors	Only fixed compensation	Shareholders' Meeting April 14, 2016	<p>Compensation for each year of activity<sup>2</sup>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• for the Chairman of Board of Statutory Auditors: € 140,000</li> <li>• for each Standing Auditor: € 100,000</li> <li>• € 400 attendance fee for participating to each meeting of the Statutory Auditors, of the BoD and of the Board Committees</li> </ul>	
Executives with strategic responsibilities	Fixed and variable compensation	Board of Directors	<p>2016 compensation level:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• for the CEO: €2,000,000 fixed<sup>3</sup></li> <li>• for the General Manager: € 1,200,000 fixed</li> <li>• for the other Executives with strategic responsibilities: € 5,381,365 fixed</li> <li>• no variable compensation awarded in 2016<sup>4</sup></li> </ul>	<p>For 2016, the maximum ratio between variable and fixed compensation is:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 200% for the CEO, the GM and for the Executives with strategic responsibilities, responsible for business lines</li> <li>• 33% for the Executives with strategic responsibilities, responsible for Company Control Functions</li> <li>• 100% for the other Executives with strategic responsibilities</li> </ul>

1 Even if these meetings are held in the same day  
 2 Alternate Auditors do not receive any compensation  
 3 Including the compensation paid for the director relationship  
 4 Not including variable compensation paid to two incumbents referring to the positions covered before September 1, 2016 for a total amount of € 0.3 m

Starting from January 1, 2017, the remuneration for the Chairman of the Board of Directors, for the Deputy Chairmen and for the Chief Executive Officer has been reduced by 40%. For more details, see chapter 1

**Further details on Executives with strategic responsibilities**

For 2016, according to Group Compensation Policy, in line with regulatory provisions, the maximum ratio between variable and fixed compensation has been defined ex ante for the Group CEO (the sole executive director sitting on the Board of Directors and employee of the Company) and the other Executives with strategic responsibilities.

The balance between variable and fixed components has been defined considering also the company's strategic goals, risk management policies and other elements influencing the business of the company.

With reference to the table at the previous page, for Executives with strategic responsibilities it is specified that:

- the fixed component is defined taking into consideration market information and in such a way to be sufficient to reward the activity rendered even if the variable part of the remuneration package were not paid due to non-achievement of performance goals
- in line with the latest regulatory requirements, the Chief Executive Officer as well as the other Executives with strategic responsibilities have a balanced part of their remuneration linked to the economic results of UniCredit, taking into consideration the overall profitability, weighted by risk and cost of capital, as well as sustainability goals (based on capital and liquidity ratios).

For 2016, the variable compensation takes into consideration the achievement of specific goals which were previously approved by the Board<sup>1</sup> upon proposal of the Remuneration Committee and the opinion of the Board of Statutory Auditors and the Internal Controls & Risks Committee, as appropriate.

In particular, metrics defined ex ante that reflect categories of our Group Risk Appetite Framework align Executives' remuneration to sustainable performance and value creation for the shareholders in a medium/ long term perspective.

Such coherence is annually verified by the Internal Control & Risk Committee. Specific individual goals are set out taking into consideration the market practices and the role assigned within the group,

through the systematic use of specific indicators aimed at strengthening the sustainability of business, such as the satisfaction of both external and internal customers, risk and financial sustainability indicators and capital measures.

Further details regarding our performance management and evaluation are provided further in paragraph 5.4.

It is foreseen the deferral/holding of 80% of the incentive in 5 years, in cash and shares, with payout subject to the achievement of future performance conditions over the following financial years.

All the installments are subject to the application of malus and / or claw-back conditions, as legally enforceable.

The 50% of the overall incentive is paid in UniCredit shares, whose number is defined considering the arithmetic mean of the official market price of UniCredit ordinary shares during the month preceding the Board to which the 2016 bonuses are submitted.

The measure and duration of the deferral are aligned with the provisions set by regulators and are consistent with the characteristics of the business and with the company's risk profiles.

For the Heads of the Company Control Functions, pursuant to the provisions of Bank of Italy, the goals are established by the Board of Directors in line with the tasks assigned to them and avoiding, unless good reasons exist, goals linked to Bank's performance. In the decision making process related to Company Control Functions, the Board of Statutory Auditors and the Internal Controls and Risks Committee are also involved as far as they are respectively concerned.

In particular, for 2016, the individual goals of the Heads of the Internal Audit, Compliance functions and Risk Management (CRO) are not connected to the Company's performance. For the Manager in charge of preparing the company's financial reports, the Board of Directors has verified the existence of valid reasons to insert goals linked to the performance results of UniCredit only in a very limited measure and such as not to lead to potential conflicts of interests.

With reference to the year 2016, on March 13, 2017 the Board of Directors decided not to proceed with

<sup>1</sup> On the basis of the organizational changes as of September 1, 2016, the Performance Screens for the Executives with strategic responsibilities have been updated in order to align the performance assessment to the responsibilities of the new roles. In particular, for the roles in which the incumbent has changed, the new recipients have inherited the goals from their predecessor. For the new roles, new Performance Screens have been created, keeping, if possible, the same goals previously assigned for each incumbent

any bonus payment for 2016 for the CEO and the General Manager and other Executives with strategic responsibilities<sup>2</sup>.

Further information regarding the 2016 incentive plans implementation and outcomes is provided in paragraph 5.2.

On May 13, 2015, a long-term incentive plan was introduced for the previous Chief Executive Officer, the current General Manager (for the position held before September 1, 2016) and the previous Deputy General Manager Group COO.

The Plan provided for the allocation of incentives based on Phantom Shares UniCredit, subject to the achievement of specific performance conditions linked to the 2018 UniCredit Strategic Plan approved on March 11, 2014. The Plan provided for a four-year performance period, in line with the UniCredit Strategic Plan mentioned above and the allocation of two possible awards in 2017 and 2019, in line with the disclosure of the Strategic Plan. For further information on the Plan, refer to the 2015 Group Compensation Policy – Section III, paragraph 5.5.

With reference to this Long Term Incentive Plan and the award foreseen for 2017, the Board of Directors on March 13, 2017, given the group's results in 2016 and the change of UniCredit strategy that led to the launch of the new LTI Plan 2017-2019 tied to the Strategic Plan *Transform 2019*, exercised its downward discretion and decided not to proceed with any payments.

In addition, it was agreed to cancel the second award foreseen for 2019, considering the launch of the new LTI Plan linked to the Strategic Plan *Transform 2019*. The Long-Term Incentive Plan launched in 2015 is therefore closed.


The review of the group compensation framework implies the revision of the 2017 compensation pay-mix for Executives with strategic responsibilities, with reference to the variable component and the weight of short-term and long-term components, the last one represented by the 2017-2019 LTI Plan tied to the Strategic Plan *Transform 2019*<sup>3</sup>:

For the CEO, General Manager and for other Executives with strategic responsibilities<sup>4</sup>, share ownership guidelines are in place, further details in Section II - paragraph 3.5.


<sup>2</sup> The Board of Directors resolved not to pay even the incentive for the former CEO and the former Deputy General Manager, Group COO, whose employment ended during 2016  
<sup>3</sup> The personnel belonging to Company Control Functions is not included in the Plan  
<sup>4</sup> Considering the application, from 2016, of the new ratio between the variable and the fixed components of remuneration for Company Control Functions (which could not exceed the limit of one third for the Identified Staff within Italian Control Functions, while the fixed remuneration is expected to be the predominant component for the Control Functions of other geographies), share ownership guidelines are not applied to Executives who are part of Company Control Functions

● Fixed compensation ● Variable compensation STI  
 ● Variable compensation LTI (% rounded value)


**Chief Executive Officer<sup>1</sup> and General Manager<sup>2</sup>**




**Executives with strategic responsibilities belonging to business functions**



**Executives with strategic responsibilities belonging to Company Control Functions**



**Other Executives with strategic responsibilities**



<sup>1</sup> For 2016 the eligibility for the LTI component (LTI 2015-2018) applied to the previous CEO, whose employment contract ended in 2016  
<sup>2</sup> New position created as of September 1, 2016, eligibility for the LTI component (LTI 2015-2018) based on the position previously held

Section III • Annual Compensation Report

→ 4. Compensation to Directors, Statutory Auditors and Executives with Strategic Responsibilities

Compensation paid to Members of the administrative and auditing bodies, to General Managers and to other Executives with strategic responsibilities (Disclosure consistent to Consob Issuers Regulation nr. 11971)

Members of Board of Directors (name and surname)	BoD	Internal controls & risks committee	Remuneration committee	Corporate governance, nomination and sustainability committee	Related-parties and equity investments committee	Total fixed comp.*	Variable non-equity compensation bonuses and other incentives	Non monetary benefits	Other remuneration	Total	Fair value of equity comp.***	Severance indemnity for end of office or termination of employment
Giuseppe Vita	C	M	M	M		1,561,600		4,732	3,957	1,570,289		
Vincenzo Calandra Buonaura	DC	M		M		347,000		7,244		354,244		
Luca Cordero di Montezemolo	DC			C		310,200				310,200		
Fabrizio Patenzona	DC	M		M		343,800				343,800		
Jean Pierre Mustier (CEO) <sup>2</sup>	M					955,887		30,720	15,132	1,001,740	60,348	
Mohamed Hamad Al Mehairi	M					96,000				96,000		
Sergio Balbinot <sup>3</sup>	M					55,195				55,195		
Cesare Bioni	M	M			C	200,800				200,800		
Hennyka Bochniarz	M		M			143,600				143,600		
Martha Boeckenfeld <sup>4</sup>	M					26,504				26,504		
Alessandro Caltagirone	M		C	M		192,800				192,800		
Lucrezia Reichlin	M	M			M	189,600				189,600		
Clara Streit	M	M		M		190,000				190,000		
Paola Vezzani	M	M			M	191,200				191,200		
Alexander Wolfgring	M	C	M			299,200		7,244		306,444		
Anthony Wyand	M	M	M			189,200				189,200		
Elena Zambon	M			M		142,800				142,800		
Members that left off during the Period												
Federico Ghizzoni (CEO) <sup>5</sup>	M					1,065,283	275,000	254,162	15,069	1,609,514	1,184,761	(A) 9,586,284
Manfred Bischoff <sup>6</sup>	M					42,433				42,433		
Helga Jung <sup>7</sup>	M					41,633				41,633		
<b>Total Board of Directors</b>						<b>6,584,734</b>	<b>275,000</b>	<b>304,102</b>	<b>34,158</b>	<b>7,197,995</b>	<b>1,245,109</b>	<b>9,586,284</b>

C Chairman DC Deputy Chairman M Member

Statutory auditors (name and surname)	Role	Total fixed comp.*	Variable non-equity compensation - bonuses and other incentives	Non monetary benefits	Other remuneration	Total	Fair value of equity comp.**	Severance indemnity for end of office or termination of employment
Maurizio Lauri	Chairman <sup>8</sup>	45,970		7,250		53,220		
Pierpaolo Singer	Chairman <sup>9</sup>	158,079		7,250		165,329		
Angelo Rocco Bonissoni	Standing auditor	127,200		7,250		134,450		
Enrico Laghi	Standing auditor	119,200		7,250		126,450		
Benedetta Navarra	Standing auditor	95,370		7,250		102,620		
Maria Enrica Spinardi	Standing auditor	130,000		7,250		137,250		
<b>Total Statutory Auditors</b>		<b>675,819</b>		<b>43,500</b>		<b>719,319</b>		

\* Included compensation for committee participation and attendance tokens

- 1 Office held until March 1, 2017
- 2 Office held from July 12, 2016
- 3 Member of the Board from June 9, 2016
- 4 Member of the Board from September 22, 2016
- 5 Office held until July 11, 2016
- 6 Member of the Board until May 31, 2016
- 7 Member of the Board until May 31, 2016
- 8 Office held until April 14, 2016
- 9 Office held from April 14, 2016

Section III • Annual Compensation Report

→ 4. Compensation to Directors, Statutory Auditors and Executives with Strategic Responsibilities

Executives with strategic responsibilities (name and surname)	Total fixed comp.	Variable non-equity compensation - bonuses and other incentives	Non monetary benefits	Other remuneration	Total	Fair value of equity comp.**	Severance indemnity for end of office or termination of employment
Federico Ghizzoni <sup>10</sup> (General Manager)	330,922		86,038	6,142	423,103		(A)
Gianni Franco Papa <sup>11</sup> (General Manager)	400,000	97,042	91,504	22,491	611,037	98,569	
Other Executives with strategic responsibilities (Total 7,33 FTE on yearly basis)	5,994,217	726,620	804,028	387,266	7,912,131	1,411,814	(B) 3,937,373

For further details, refer to the document attached to the 2017 Group Compensation Policy, published on the UniCredit website, in the section dedicate to the Shareholders' Meeting.

**FOCUS**  
Indemnities to Directors in the event of resignations, dismissal or termination of employment following a public purchase offer (as per Sect. 123/bis, paragraph 1, letter i), of TUF):

None of the Directors have contracts containing clauses envisaging the payment of indemnities, or the right to keep post-retirement benefits, in the event of resignations or dismissal/revocation without just cause or if the employment relationship is terminated following a public purchase offer. In case of early termination of the mandate, the ordinary law provisions would therefore apply.

The individual employment, as Executive, of the Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Jean Pierre Mustier, is today governed - also with regards to the event of resignations, dismissal/revocation or termination - by the ordinary provisions of the law and National Labor Agreement for Banking Industry Executives dated July 13, 2015.

In this context, as announced during a Capital Markets Day held in London on December 13, 2016 for the presentation of the 2016-2019 Strategic Plan *Transform 2019* to analysts and investors, the Chief Executive Officer Jean Pierre Mustier declared that he will renounce to any severance or notice payment, for any reason of separation from the bank.

Non-executive Directors do not receive, within incentive plans, UniCredit subscription rights. For the Chief Executive Officer no specific provisions are provided with reference to the right to keep, in case of termination, the options received and the plans' provisions apply.

For Directors currently in office, provisions do not exist regarding the establishment of advisory contracts for a term following the termination of the directorship, nor the right to keep post retirement perks. No agreements exist either providing compensation for non-competition undertakings.

10 Office held from July 12 to September 30, 2016  
 11 Office held from September 1, 2016. The amounts refer to the sole period in which the role of General Manager has been covered. The quota of the compensation related to the previous role has been included in the data related to the other Executives with strategic responsibilities  
 (A) Overall amount of the payments related to the employment and directorship resolution. As already disclosed with the Press Releases of June 30, 2016 and October 26, 2016, the amount of € 4,575,678 gross (corresponding to the cost of the indemnity in lieu of notice and to 20% of the severance) has been paid upon termination, while for the remaining quota of the severance of € 5,010,606 gross it is foreseen the deferred disbursement over further 5 years, in cash and shares, conditional to maintenance of adequate capitalization and liquidity requirements by the Bank and subject to malus and claw-back clauses  
 (B) Overall amount of the payments related to the employment resolution of one Executive with strategic responsibilities. The amount of € 2,275,885 euro gross (corresponding to the cost of the indemnity in lieu of notice and to 20% of the severance) has been paid upon termination, while for the remaining quota of the severance of € 1,661,488 gross it is foreseen the deferred disbursement over further 5 years, in cash and shares, conditional to maintenance of adequate capitalization and liquidity requirements by the Bank and subject to malus and claw-back clauses  
 \*\* The "Fair value of equity compensation" does not represent a value actually paid to/gained by the beneficiaries of equity plans, being instead the cost that the Company is booking - on an accrual basis and during the vesting period - in consideration of the provision of the incentives based on financial instruments

# 5. Group Compensation Systems

## 5.1 Target population

Starting as early as 2010, UniCredit conducted every year, in alignment with specific regulation, the self-evaluation process to define the group's Identified Staff population to whom, according to internal/external regulation, specific criteria for remuneration/incentive aspects are adopted.

Starting from 2014 the assessment process for the definition of Identified Staff followed the criteria defined in the Regulatory Technical Standard of European Banking Authority (RTS)<sup>1</sup>.

In particular, it is pointed out that the assessment process provides for the inclusion within the Identified Staff population of the employees with banding equal or higher than "Senior Vice President", as defined in the Global Job Model - the classification system of roles adopted by group.

For 2016, the assessment process documented into 2016 Compensation Policy, brought to the identification of ca. 1,050<sup>2</sup> resources. Throughout


the full year 2016, the list of the group Identified Staff has been subject to continuous update, taking into account the resource turnover and the banding review process.

With regard to the 2017 process, Identified Staff population has been reviewed on March 2017 guaranteeing the full compliance with the regulatory requirements<sup>3</sup>.

Also for this year, the definition of Identified Staff followed a structured and formalized assessment process both at group and local level, internally inflected on the basis of specific guidelines provided by Group Human Resources function, with the involvement of Group Risk Management and Group Compliance, in order to guarantee a common standard approach at group level.

At process level, the control functions mentioned above have been appropriately involved both at local and central level for their respective areas of competence.

### Process to define group's Identified Staff population



1 European Banking Authority (EBA) Regulatory Technical Standards on criteria to identify categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on an institution's risk profile under Article 94 (2) of Directive 2013/36/EU  
 2 Information included in the document reflects the classification under IFRS5 of Pioneer and Bank Pekao, accounted as "Held for Sale" from December 2016. Data restated accordingly  
 3 It should be noted the last EU Decision 2015/2218 of the European Central Bank at November 20, 2015, regarding the exclusion procedure for the staff members who may have a significant impact on the risk profile of a supervised credit institution ( ECB / 2015/38 )

The recognition of employees with significant impact on the group's risk has taken into account the role, the decision-making power related to the managerial responsibility and, in addition, the total compensation level.

In March 2017 the assessment process for the definition of Identified Staff population, evaluated by an external independent advisor, brought to the identification of a total number of approximately 900 resources.


As a result of the analysis and as approved by the Board of Directors, upon Remuneration Committee proposal, the following categories of staff have been reconfirmed for 2017 as Identified Staff: Group CEO, Group Executives responsible for day-to-day management (General Manager, Senior Executive Vice Presidents and Executive Vice Presidents), executive

positions in Company Control Functions (Audit, Risk Management, Compliance and Human Resources) and executive positions in Finance, as they are responsible at group level for strategic decisions which may have a relevant impact on the bank's risk profile. Furthermore, Senior Vice President (SVP) population, Board Members, senior management and other specific roles in group's Legal Entities have been included in the definition of Identified Staff, as per the current regulatory criteria.


Target population represents approximately ca. 0.8% of the group employee population, with this outcome being in line with the results of 2016 process.

Compensation data and vehicles used for the target population in 2016 are disclosed in chapter 7 of this Report.

### Geographical distribution of Identified Staff



### Breakdown by business



TOTAL NUMBER OF IDENTIFIED STAFF: ~ 900

Note: Identified Staff data refer to the population as per March 2017, providing for an ex-ante definition in line with regulatory requirements

**FOCUS**  
**Global Job Model**

The Global Job Model is a state-of-the-art system that describes and evaluates all jobs within UniCredit and supports the management of people and processes in a global, simple and consistent way. It is easy to understand, based on market practice and aligned with our business needs.

Global Job Model is the platform for people management, consisting of two key elements: global job catalogue and 9 global bands, the highest bands identify group senior management:

- Group Chief Executive Officer and General Manager
- Senior Executive Vice Presidents (SEVP), having responsibility for determining the group business strategy and a strong influence on it. Determining or strongly influencing decisions that will impact on the entire organization and having direct responsibility for a core part of the group. As a general rule, the SEVPs are first reporting lines to the CEO or the General Manager
- Executive Vice Presidents (EVP), having significant influence on defining the strategy of a division/competence line/department or having a strong impact on the results of large/medium large legal entities or Businesses. As a general rule, the EVPs are first reporting lines to the SEVPs.

The framework described above is consistent with point (9) of Article 3(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU8, according to which “senior management” means those natural persons who exercise executive functions within an institution and who are responsible, and accountable to the management body, for the day-to-day management of the institution.



## 5.2 2016 Incentive System implementation and outcomes

The 2016 System, approved by UniCredit Board of Directors on January 13, 2016, provides for a ‘bonus pool’ approach that directly links bonuses with company results at group and country/division level and ensure a strong connection between profitability, risk and reward.

Such a system, implemented within the framework of our policy and governance, provides for the allocation of a performance related bonus in cash and/or free ordinary shares over 6 years.

### Bonus pool sizing

The bonus pools dimension for each of the 10 clusters<sup>1</sup> is related to the actual profitability measures multiplied for the bonus pool funding rate defined in the budgeting phase. This calculation determines the so called “theoretical bonus pool” for each cluster that is adjusted accordingly to the actual trend of performance of the respective segment.

### 2016 Entry conditions at group and local level

In order to align to regulatory requirements, specific indicators measuring annual profitability, solidity and liquidity results had been set at both local and group level as entry conditions. In particular, risk metrics and thresholds for the 2016 Group Incentive System as defined within the Entry Conditions - that confirms, reduces or cancels upfront and deferred payouts - include:

#### Entry conditions of 2016 Group Incentive System

Group	Local
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NOP adjusted <math>\geq 0</math> and</li> <li>• Net Profit <math>\geq 0</math> and</li> <li>• Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio Transitional <math>\geq 10\%</math> and</li> <li>• Liquidity Coverage Ratio <math>&gt;75\%</math></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NOP adjusted <math>\geq 0</math> and</li> <li>• Net Profit <math>\geq 0</math></li> </ul>

• **NOP adjusted** to measure profitability, Net Operating Profit adjusted excluding income from buy-back of own debt and from the fair value accounting of own liabilities.

• **Net Profit** to measure profitability, considering the results stated in the balance sheet excluding any extraordinary item as considered appropriate by the Board of Directors upon the Remuneration Committee’s proposal.

• **Common Equity Tier 1 ratio transitional** that ensures the alignment with the threshold set as the outcome of the SREP process (Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process) coordinated by the European Central Bank. The level of 10% includes also the 0.25% buffer set for systemically relevant banks for 2016.

• **Liquidity Coverage Ratio** that ensures that bank maintains an adequate level of not restricted “High Quality Liquid Assets” in a sufficient quantity to cover the overall ‘Net Cash Outflows’, over a period of thirty days, under gravely stressed conditions specified by Supervisors.

According to the actual results, approved by the Board of Directors on March 13, 2017<sup>2</sup>, the relevant entry conditions have not been achieved at group level as reported in the next page.

At country/division level, entry conditions:

- have been achieved by Asset Gathering, Commercial Banking Germany, CEE, CIB, Bank Austria Subgroup, UniCredit Bank AG Subgroup
- have not been achieved by Commercial Banking Italy, Commercial Banking Austria, Corporate Center Global (Holding), UBIS e GBS Holding.

<sup>1</sup> Information included in the document reflects the classification under IFRS5 of Pioneer and Bank Pekao, accounted as “Held for Sale” from December 2016. Data restated accordingly

<sup>2</sup> The Board of Directors on March 13, 2017 acknowledged the communication of ECB of March 6, confirming full compliance to regulatory requirements after share capital increase conclusion

	Entry conditions	Achievement	Bonus pool scenario
Group	NET PROFIT ≥ 0 €/mnl	✗ - € 11.790 mnl	<b>Zero factor</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CB Italy</li> <li>• CC Global (Holding)</li> <li>• CB Austria</li> <li>• UBIS e GBS Holding</li> </ul>
	CET 1 RATIO TRANS ≥ 10%	✓*	
	NOP ADJUSTED ≥ 0 €/mnl	✗ - € 5.858 mnl	
	LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO >75%	✓	
Each bonus pool	ALL above "ENTRY CONDITIONS"...	✓	<b>Partially open (50%)</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CB Germany</li> <li>• UniCredit Bank AG Subgroup</li> <li>• Bank Austria Subgroup</li> <li>• CEE</li> <li>• CIB</li> <li>• Asset Gathering</li> </ul>
	...excepting for Commercial Banking Italy, Commercial Banking Austria, Corporate Center Global (Holding), UBIS and GBS Holding	✗	

\* In the Financial Report 2016 CET 1 Ratio Transitional is reported as equal to 8.15%. Considering capital increase effects, the value at December 2016 would be equal to 11.49%. CET 1 fully loaded would be equal to 11.15%

### 2016 Group Incentive System rules application

Based on the different scenarios deriving from entry conditions assessment, 2016 Group Incentive System rules have been applied.

In particular, for the pools in "Zero factor" scenario- Commercial Banking Italy, Commercial Banking Austria, Corporate Center Global (Holding), UBIS e GBS Holding:

- malus conditions have been activated by applying Zero factor to Executives and Identified Staff population
- for the population which is not Identified Staff, bonus pool has been reduced by 40%
- with reference to the Identified Staff belonging to Company Control Functions, in order to keep an adequate level of independence, a maximum 50% reduction of the bonus pool has been provided<sup>3</sup>
- in order to maintain the minimum pay levels need to play in the market, a discretionary bonus pool had been allocated to 4% of total Identified Staff population.

For the pools in "Partially open" scenario- Asset Gathering, Commercial Banking Germany, CEE, CIB, Bank Austria Subgroup, UniCredit Bank AG Subgroup:

- theoretical bonus pool has been reduced by 50%, as group entry conditions were not achieved
- new theoretical value has been adjusted within 50-125%, based on the assessment of the overall economic and risk sustainability evaluated by Group CFO and CRO through the dashboards<sup>4</sup>. The combined evaluation of the CRO and CFO metrics resulted in a positive assessment on economic and risk sustainability for all pools
- based on the previous points, considering the positive performance of each segment versus the assigned budget and the fact that group 2016 results embedded not recurring items related to Plan *Transform 2019* execution, the Board of Directors resolved a discretionary adjustment on the whole equal to 5% of the total, for the population which is not Identified Staff within all segments, excluding CIB.


### Bonus pool distribution by segments

The results of the above mentioned steps has brought to the distribution of the bonus pool for the Identified Staff population (ca. 1,050 resources), as reported in the next page.

In particular, for the pools in "Zero factor" scenario, 2016 bonus was not paid to 76% of Identified Staff (87% excluding Company Control Functions).

For 2016, UniCredit Board of Directors has taken into consideration the Remuneration Committee's

<sup>3</sup> As per relevant regulations  
<sup>4</sup> CRO and CFO dashboards considers respectively -risk indicators linked to Group Risk Appetite Framework, to evaluate the risk sustainability at group and country/division level and -performance indicators connected with the Strategic Plan, to evaluate the economic sustainability over the time



proposals and regulatory guidelines regarding variable remuneration.

The assessment related to remuneration decisions, similar to past years, has been supported by a strict group governance process in order to guarantee consistency and transparency from all parties involved in the decision-making process. The total amount of variable compensation for Identified Staff, detailed in paragraph 7.1, is sustainable given the bank's financial position and does not limit bank's ability to hold an adequate level of capital and liquidity.

Upon the assessment of achievement level for goals defined for 2016 and subsequent governance step in the Board of March 13, 2017 the allocation of ca. 3 m UniCredit ordinary shares was promised to ca. 430 Identified Staff to be distributed in 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022. The actual allocation of the last three installments is subject to the application of Zero Factor for 2019, 2020 and 2021 respectively. Therefore, the 2016 Group Incentive System would entail an expected impact on UniCredit share capital of approximately 0.14%, assuming the achievement of group performance thresholds based on Zero Factor.

With reference to previous years Plans, the Board of Directors resolved to apply, for all the Identified Staff in a "Zero factor" segment, a 50% reduction of the outstanding deferrals due in 2017 (deferred from 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 Plans).

For further details on the execution of the 2016 Group Incentive System and the deferrals of previous years' Plans, refer to Chapter 7 and to the attachment to 2017 Group Compensation Policy, published on the UniCredit website, in the section dedicated to 2017 Shareholder's Meeting.

### Evaluation and payout for Chief Executive Officer and General Manager

With reference to 2016, the CEO, announced during a Capital Markets Day held in London on December 13, 2016 to present to analysts and investors the 2016-2019 Strategic Plan *Transform 2019*, his willingness to renounce to any variable compensation.

In line with group governance, 2016 assessment and payment for the CEO, General Manager and other Executives with strategic responsibilities perimeter have been reviewed by the Remuneration Committee and approved by the Board of Directors, heard the Statutory Auditors and Internal Controls and Risks Committee as relevant.

On March 13, 2017 the Board of Directors, considering group 2016 results, while expressing its sincere appreciation for the work done by the Management in relation with the in depth strategic review that brought the presentation and the launch of the implementation of the 2016-2019 Strategic Plan *Transform 2019*, resolved not to proceed with any bonus payment for 2016 for the CEO, General Manager and the other Executives with strategic responsibilities<sup>5</sup>, independently from individual performance assessment.

To be thorough, the Performance Screen 2016<sup>6</sup> of the CEO and the General Manager included the following indicators referring to group perimeter:

- Economic Profit (EVA)
- Stay within Risk Appetite Framework
- Common Equity Tier 1 ratio fully loaded

<sup>5</sup> The Board of Directors resolved not to pay any incentive for 2016 also for the previous CEO and Deputy General Manager COO whose employment contracts ended in 2016  
<sup>6</sup> From appointment date: July 12, 2016 for the CEO and September 1, 2016 for the General Manager

- GOP/RWA
- Stakeholder Value: Customer satisfaction (TRI\*M external); People Engagement, Reputation
- Execution of strategic plan
- Tone from the top on conduct and compliance culture, also coherent with FSB guidelines.

### 2016 variable and fixed compensation for Chief Executive Officer and General Manager

As for 2016 incentive no pay out is envisaged, 2016 remuneration for the CEO and the General Manager is composed by fixed component only.

The CEO yearly fixed remuneration for 2016 was equal to € 2m, including director's remuneration. It has been paid pro rata for the period July 12, 2016 - December 31, 2016 for the amount of € 0.95 m.

Effective from January 1, 2017, CEO fixed remuneration has been reduced by 40%, consistent with his request to the Board of Directors and as he announced to the market at a Capital Markets Day in London on December 13, 2016.

With reference to 2016, the General Manager received a total fixed remuneration of € 1.2 m, of which € 0.4 m pro-rated referring to General Manager position.

### Local coordination and specific programs

The elements of the Group Incentive System are fully applied across the entire Identified Staff population, with local adaptations based on specific regulations and / or business specifics, consistent with the overall group approach.

Being fully compliant with the principles of the incentive plans, local adaptations allow the achievement of the same results if the implementation of the group plan should have some adverse effects (legal, tax or other) for the group companies and/or beneficiaries residing in countries where the group is present. Implementation approach of group incentive plans for Identified Staff fully complies with Bank of Italy requirements and European guidelines, and at the same time considers:

- local needs to adopt alternative solutions as necessary according to local regulators
- annual Audit, in each jurisdiction, on the implementation of the incentive systems
- further needs to introduce corrective measures to address local specificities, with focus on the reconciliation of local differences and home/host regulatory roles.

In this regard, a specific authorization had been granted to the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer to make appropriate changes for the implementation of the Plan, that do not alter the substance of the resolution of the Board of Directors and the Shareholders' Meeting.

The main adjustments authorized by the shareholders regarding the implementation of the Group System concerned the use of financial instruments different than the UniCredit shares, for Zagrebacka Banka in Croatia, Bank Pekao in Poland and FinecoBank in Italy. These changes were implemented considering specific requests formulated by local regulators (such as the Croatian National Bank for Croatia or the Financial Supervision Authority in Poland).

In addition, consistency with the exercise of the powers granted to the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer, these changes were subsequently authorized and adjustments which primarily impact threshold limits for deferral and the percentage of payments distribution were made. These are, in any case, more restrictive than those of the group align with the use of local instruments and performance indicators rather than those of the group, in line with specific recommendations received from the local Authorities.

For the general employee population, specific systems are implemented, considering market local practices.

## 5.3 2017 Group Incentive System

In line with past years, the 2017 Group Incentive System, as approved by UniCredit Board of Directors on January 10, 2017, is based on a bonus pool approach which takes into consideration most recent national and international regulatory requirements and links bonuses with company results at group and country/division level, ensuring a strong connection between profitability, risk and reward. In particular, the system provides for:


- the definition of 8<sup>1</sup> bonus pools for each country/division, whose size depends on actual profitability
- allocation of a variable incentive defined on the basis of the determined bonus pool
- a malus clause (Zero Factor) which applies in case specific thresholds of profitability, capital and liquidity are not met at both group and country/division level

- risk adjusted measures in order to guarantee long term sustainability, regarding company financial position and to ensure compliance with regulations
- definition of a balanced structure of upfront (following the moment of performance evaluation) and deferred payments, in cash and/or shares, to be paid over a period of up to 6 years
- distribution of share payments which take into account the applicable regulatory requirements regarding the application of share retention periods.

### 2017 Bonus pool cluster

Asset Gathering	Commercial Banking Austria
CEE	Commercial Banking Germany
CEO & COO Functions	Commercial Banking Italy
CIB	UniCredit Bank AG Subgroup

The 2017 Incentive System is based on the following methodology:



1 Bonus pool structure has been reviewed considering the classification under IFRS5 of Pioneer and Bank Pekao, accounted as "Held for Sale" from December 2016 and the centralization of CEE subholding in UniCredit S.p.A.

2 Risk adjusted or Risk related

### 1. Bonus Pool Funding

The bonus pools are initially proposed during the budgeting phase for every cluster as a percentage of their respective Funding KPI (e.g. Net Operating Profit). In such a definition the following elements are considered: historical data analysis, expected profitability, business strategy, previous year pool, internal and external benchmarking. The budget is submitted to the approval of UniCredit Board of Directors.


The bonus pools set for each cluster are adjusted accordingly to the intra-annual trend of the respective funding KPI, with 1st, 2nd and 3rd quarter forecast being affected by performance trends.

Bonus pools are based on the risk weighted results of each country/division, in line with overall group performance, considering the assessment of both group and country risk sustainability.

### 2. Entry Conditions

Specific "Entry Conditions" are set at both group and country/division level.

The combined evaluation of the Entry Conditions at group and local level define 4 possible scenarios that allows the confirmation to increase, reduce or cancel the bonus pool for each cluster.



1 NOP excluding income from buy-back of own debt and from the fair value accounting of own liabilities  
 2 Net Profit stated in the Balance Sheet, excluding any extraordinary items as considered appropriate by the Board of Directors upon Remuneration Committee proposal  
 3 CET 1 Ratio transitional: ensures to maintain a buffer equal to 0.25% on top of the threshold set as the outcome of the SREP process (Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process) coordinated by the European Central Bank. The level of 10% includes, in addition to Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 minimum, the combined buffer requirement applicable in 2017 and the Pillar 2 guidance. The Pillar 2 guidance has been set additional risks under stress conditions, and a failure to meet this threshold does not automatically trigger actions by Authorities  
 4 Liquidity Coverage Ratio: it aims to ensure that the bank maintains an adequate level of not restricted "High Quality Liquid Assets" in a sufficient quantity to cover the overall "Net Cash Outflows", over a period of thirty days, under gravely stressed conditions specified by Supervisors  
 5 Net Stable Funding Ratio: is defined as the amount of available stable funding relative to the amount of required stable funding and measures, under a long term perspective, the sustainability terms of maturities between asset and liabilities. In detail: the ratio between Available of Stable Funding – ASF (The amount of ASF is calculated by first assigning the carrying value of an institution's capital and liabilities; the amount assigned to each category is then multiplied by an ASF factor, and the total ASF is the sum of the weighted amounts) e Required Stable Funding – RSF (The amount of required stable funding is calculated by first assigning the carrying value of an institution's assets to the categories listed. The amount assigned to each category is then multiplied by its associated required stable funding (RSF) factor, and the total RSF is the sum of the weighted amounts added to the amount of Off Balance Sheet activity -or potential liquidity exposure- multiplied by its associated RSF factor)  
 3, 4, 5 In case of issues with capital and/or liquidity requirements at Legal Entity level, the related bonus pool size could be impacted, even if the Entry Conditions at group level are fully satisfied  
 6 For Executive & Identified Staff population. For the other employees, a significant reduction will be applied. In any case, the Board of Directors can provide the CEO the possibility to allocate a separate and discretionary pool for retention purposes only, subject to local relevant governance bodies' decision, eventually including a positive feedback from ECB, if required (e.g. in a scenario of CET1r < threshold, in a context of a capital contingency plan defined with ECB)  
 7 In case Entry Conditions are not met at group level, no bonus pay out is envisaged for the Group CEO and General Manager and all the Senior Executive Vice Presidents, irrespective of Country or area of activity  
 \* In case a division/segment, which is part of a Legal Entity with positive net profit and adequate capital ratios, has a budget less than 0, the local entry conditions would refer to this value

The malus condition (Zero Factor) will apply in case the specific metrics on profitability, capital and liquidity are not achieved both at group and local level (box A of the matrix included in the scheme "Entry Conditions definition"). Specifically, the Zero Factor is applied to the Identified Staff population<sup>3</sup>, whereas for the non-Identified Staff population, a significant reduction will be applied. Moreover, at individual level it will be also considered the respect of provisions of law, group's compliance rules, Company policies or integrity values, Code of Conduct and the application of claw-back clauses, as legally enforceable.

In case the Entry Conditions are not met at country/division level, but at group level they are met (box B of the matrix included in the scheme "Entry Conditions definition"), a floor might be defined for retention purposes and in order to maintain the minimum pay levels needed to play in the market.

In case Entry Conditions are not met at group level, no bonus pay out is envisaged for the Group CEO and General Manager and all the Senior Executive Vice Presidents, irrespective of country or area of activity.

### 3. Adjustments based on sustainability and risk

In order to ensure consistency with the Group Risk Appetite Framework and the economic sustainability of the group's and country / division results over time, the bonus pool may be revised up /downwards, on the basis of the overall "quality of performance".

As some performance and sustainability KPIs are already included within RAF (e.g. ROAC), while others, aligned to the Strategic Plan, are reflected in the Performance Screens of Senior Executive Vice Presidents and lower levels (for further details see par. 5.4), in order to avoid double counting, for 2017 the methodology has been simplified by envisaging only Group CRO assessment. Moreover, the Group CFO will present to the Remuneration Committee a specific relation on each segment results.

The group and local risk dashboards include indicators covering all relevant risks, such as credit, market and liquidity and the risk position assumed, the adherence to regulatory requirements and the relationship between risk and profitability. The specific metrics are measured with reference to the respective relevant thresholds (limit, trigger and target), established in line to the Group Risk Appetite Framework. By way of example, the standard structures of Risk dashboard are shown in the following picture.

<sup>3</sup> The bonus pool of 2017 will be zeroed (for Identified Staff), while deferrals of previous year systems could be reduced from 50% to 100% of their value, based on the entity of loss both at group & local level and CRO assessment based on positioning vs. RAF (next paragraph – Adjustments based on Sustainability and Risk)

### CRO Dashboard

ILLUSTRATIVE

Indicators covering all relevant risks set in alignment with Group Risk Appetite Framework

Dimension	Metric	Assessment			
		1Q.	2Q.	3Q.	4Q.
Capital	CET1r	■	■	■	■
	Leverage Ratio	■	■	■	■
Liquidity	LCR	■	■	■	■
	NSFR	■	■	■	■
	Funding GAP	■	■	■	■
Return & Risk	RAOC	■	■	■	■
Credit Risk	EL% Stock	■	■	■	■
	EL% New Bus.	■	■	■	■
	Abs. NPE Exp.	■	■	■	■
	Coverage on Imp.	■	■	■	■
Market Risk	Max.Dom.Sov.Exp.	■	■	■	■
	Max RWA Mkt. Risk	■	■	■	■
IRRBB	EV sen.	■	■	■	■
Operational	ELOR	■	■	■	■

■ Better than target    ■ Better than trigger  
 ■ Better than limit    ■ Worse than limit

### APPRAISAL



### OVERALL APPRAISAL AND ADJUSTMENT DIRECTION

The evaluation of Risk sustainability brings to the application of 5 possible multipliers for the adjustment of the theoretical bonus pool for each country/division



+ Up to 20% of BoD discretion (no limits to downward discretion)

For each bonus pool cluster, the CRO Group function provides an overall assessment on the dashboards and the combined evaluation brings to the definition of a 'multiplier' to be applied to Entry Conditions in order to define the maximum adjustment to each bonus pool.

The application of a further discretionary range up to +20% in the faculty of Board of Directors is foreseen with respect to the theoretical value, while there is no limit to a downward discretionary adjustment of the bonus pool.

In case the Entry Conditions are not met only at group level, the gate is "partially open", with the possibility to payout a reduced bonus pool (minimum reduction of 28%<sup>4</sup>), excepting for the Group CEO and General Manager and all the Senior Executive Vice Presidents, irrespective of country or area of activity.

In case the Entry Conditions are met both at group and country/division level, the gate is "fully open", meaning the bonus pools may be fully confirmed or even increased (up to max 144%<sup>5</sup>), in case of a positive performance on the Risk dashboard.


In any case, as requested by regulations as per Bank of Italy "Disposizioni", the final evaluation of group sustainable performance parameters and the alignment between risk and remuneration will be assessed by the Remuneration Committee and defined under the governance and accountability of the Board of Directors.

The Board of Directors have the possibility not to take into account, when deciding bonus, balance sheet extraordinary items which do not impact operational performance, regulatory capital and liquidity (e.g. goodwill impairment).

Moreover, following potential changes in current regulations and/or in relation to potential extraordinary and/or unpredictable contingencies which can impact the group, the company or the market in which it operates, the Board of Directors, having heard the opinion of the Remuneration Committee, maintains the right to amend the system and relevant rules, consistently with the overall setup approved by the Annual General Meeting.

**Example of bonus pool definition**

ILLUSTRATIVE



4 Maximum scenario achievable in case of positive CRO assessment and using all the Board of Directors' discretion to approve a bonus pool max +20% of the Theoretical one (50%\*120%CRODashboard+ 20%Bod discretion)  
5 Maximum scenario achievable in case of positive CRO assessment and using all the Board of Directors' discretion to approve a bonus pool max +20% of the Theoretical one (100%\*120%CRODashboard+ 20%Bod discretion)

**4. Individual Allocation**

For each position of Identified Staff population a specific "Reference Value" is defined which considers the internal and/or external benchmarking analysis on similar roles, the seniority, the maximum ratio between variable and fixed compensation as approved by Annual General Meeting. Such value is adjusted according the actual available bonus pool and represents the starting point for the individual bonus allocation.

Individual bonus will be allocated managerially, considering the individual performance appraisal and the above mentioned Reference Value.

Individual performance appraisal is based on 2017 Performance Screen: minimum 5 individual goals

(suggested max. 8) assigned during the performance year, selected from our catalogue of main key performance indicators (KPI Bluebook) and based on our "Five Fundamentals"<sup>6</sup>. In particular, it is possible to include from 4 to 6 goals from the catalogue and based on priorities and annual strategies of group/business/division (weight 70%) and from 1 to 2 goals possibly customized by business/division (weight 30%). Further details in paragraph 5.4.

Competencies and behaviors considered as relevant are taken into account by the manager for the overall performance appraisal. Further details in paragraph 5.4.

The goals appraisal system is based on a 1-5 rating scale with a descriptive outcome.

**Example of 2017 Performance Screen**

	Perimeter	Target	Link to our Five Fundamentals
Goal 1 ✓ RISK ADJUSTED	Group	vs. Qualitative Assessment	Customers First
Goal 2	Group	vs. Budget	People Development
Goal 3	Group	vs. Qualitative Assessment	Cooperation & Synergies
Goal 4	Group	vs. Risk Appetite Framework Parameter	Risk Management
Goal 5 ✓ RISK ADJUSTED	Group	vs. Budget	Execution & Discipline

**Example of 2017 appraisal**

BELOW EXPECTATIONS  
ALMOST MEETS  
MEETS  
EXCEEDS  
GREATLY EXCEEDS


Individual bonus allocated managerially considering also the individual actual performance and merit<sup>7</sup>

6 Our "Five Fundamentals" are the main pillars of our "One bank, One UniCredit" culture and are at the basis of the UniCredit Competency Model that describes those behaviors that are expected from all UniCredit people and through which all employees are assessed in performance management processes. Our "Five Fundamentals" are: Customers First, People Development, Cooperation & Synergies, Risk Management, Execution & Discipline  
7 Final decision on bonus stays not deterministic and based on available pool, on Reference Value and on guidelines on bonus payout related to performance evaluation

Particular attention is dedicated to the level of correlation between bonus proposed and actual performance both at the bonus proposal step and consolidation phase:

**Performance distribution**

ILLUSTRATIVE



**Variable pay/Performance matrix**

ILLUSTRATIVE

Bonus vs Position Reference	PERFORMANCE RATING				
	E - Below expectations	D - Almost meets expectations	C - Meets expectations	B - Exceeds expectations	A - Greatly exceeds expectations
> 130%					
110% - 130%				1	
90% - 110%			8	1	
70% - 90%		2			
< 70%					

**5. Payout**

As approved by the Board of Directors on January, 10, 2017, with reference to payout structure, the Identified Staff population will be differentiated into two clusters, using a combined approach of banding and compensation:

- For Executive Vice President (EVPs) and High Earner (with a bonus >= 500k) a deferral scheme of 5 years is applied, consisting in a payout structure of 6 years in total<sup>8</sup>
- For Senior Vice President (SVPs) and other Identified Staff (with a bonus < 500k) a deferral scheme of 3 years is applied, consisting in a payout structure of 5 years in total

The payout of incentives will be done through upfront and deferred installments, in cash or in UniCredit ordinary shares, up to a 6-year period:

- In 2018 the first installment of the total incentive will be paid in cash in absence of any individual values/compliance breach<sup>9</sup>
- The remaining part of the overall incentive will be paid in cash and/or UniCredit ordinary shares:
  - 2019-2023 for Executive Vice President (EVPs) and High Earner (with a bonus >= 500k)
  - 2019-2022 for Senior Vice President (SVPs) and other Identified Staff (with a bonus < 500k).

<sup>8</sup> Including other direct reports to strategic supervisory, management and control bodies and other Identified Staff as required by local regulation  
<sup>9</sup> Considering also the gravity of any internal/external findings (i.e. Audit, Bank of Italy, Consob and/or analogous local authorities)

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
EVP & above & other Identified Staff with bonus >=500k	performance year	20% upfront cash	10% deferred cash	20% upfront shares	10% deferred shares	10% deferred shares	20% deferred cash 10% deferred shares
SVP & other Identified Staff with bonus <500k	performance year	30% upfront cash	10% deferred cash	30% upfront shares	10% deferred cash 10% deferred shares	10% deferred shares	

Pay out view, including also retention period applied to upfront/deferred shares

Each further tranche will be subject to the application of the Zero Factor for the year of reference and in absence of any individual/values compliance breach<sup>10</sup>.

Additional retention period will be applied, 2 years on upfront shares and 1 year for deferred shares.

All the installments are subject to the application of claw-back conditions, as legally enforceable.

The number of shares to be allocated in the respective installments shall be defined in 2018, on the basis of the arithmetic mean of the official market price of UniCredit ordinary shares during the month preceding the Board resolution that evaluates 2017 performance achievements.

The Board of Directors could establish to assign free UniCredit ordinary shares that will be freely transferable at the end of the retention period, or in the year of the assignment, but subject to restrictions during the defined retention period (2 years retention period for upfront shares of and 1 year retention period for deferred shares). In line with national market practices, a minimum threshold will be introduced, below which no deferral mechanisms will be applied, accordingly with relevant regulatory indications.

2017 Group Incentive System provides for an expected impact on UniCredit share capital of approximately 0.72%, assuming that all free shares for employees have been distributed. The overall dilution for all other current outstanding group equity-based plans, including the 2017-2019 LTI Plan, equals 1.75%.

The beneficiaries cannot activate programs or agreements that specifically protect the value of unavailable financial instruments assigned within the incentive plans. Any form of coverage will be considered a violation of compliance rules and imply the consequences set out in the regulations, rules and procedures.

**FOCUS**  
Regulatory requirements

The payment structure of 2017 incentive system has been defined in line with the provisions included in the "Disposizioni" of Bank of Italy issued on November 2014:

- 5-year deferral period maintained only for Top Management and specific key senior roles. In general a deferral period from 3 to 5 years is required, and the request for 5 years is limited to "high earners", Top Management and Heads of key business lines
- minimum 50% of bonus to be allocated in shares or other financial instruments
- minimum 40% of bonus to be paid out under a deferral period (minimum 60% for specific positions and particularly high amounts)
- 2 years minimum retention period for the upfront shares and shorter retention period (1 year) for the deferred shares.

<sup>10</sup> Considering also the gravity of any internal/external findings (i.e. Audit, Bank of Italy, Consob and/or analogous local authorities)

## 5.4 Comprehensive Performance Management

The 2017 Group Incentive System, described in the paragraph 5.3, is supported by an annual performance measurement framework assuring coherence, consistency and clarity of performance objectives with business strategy, while encouraging and rewarding desired behaviours and risk orientation.

Our performance management process ensures all Identified Staff know what is expected of them and includes a rigorous review of their goals achievements.

Starting from 2010, a specific process is performed annually with the involvement of key relevant functions (Human Resources, Finance, Risk Management, Compliance, Group Sustainability, Audit, Group Stakeholder insight) to review the so-called KPI Bluebook.

The KPI Bluebook serves as the framework for the definition of KPI aligned to business strategy, compliant with regulatory requirements and consistent with UniCredit corporate values and Group Competency model. Therefore it supports the employees and their managers in the definition of individual Performance Screen.

KPI Bluebook includes a list of indicators certified at group level, as well as specific guidelines related to:

- the selection of goals based on annual priorities and goals possibly customized by business/division
- the use of risk-adjusted goal (e.g. at least one KPI belonging to "Risk category" or related to risk management / risk –adjusted profitability)
- the use of sustainability objectives ( e.g. at least half of the goals should be related to sustainability)
- balance use of financial and non-financial criteria, taking into account the single role's specificities. At least one KPI should be non-financial
- the definition of the target of reference, in case objectives not included in certified list are selected (e.g . use clear and pre-defined parameters for future evaluation of performance)

- the selection of goals for the Company Control Functions, in order to ensure their independence (e.g. avoid KPIs linked to economic measure, use KPIs independent of results of monitored areas to avoid conflict of interests).


The KPI Bluebook maps some categories of core drivers that include a list of goals (KPI Dashboard):

Main core drivers categories	Examples of KPIs for each category
Value creation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Revenues/Clients</li> <li>• Return On Allocated Capital</li> <li>• Risk Adjusted Capital Efficiency</li> <li>• Revenue on new business</li> <li>• ...</li> </ul>
Risk and capital governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CET1 ratio fully loaded</li> <li>• New Business EL</li> <li>• Performing Stock EL</li> <li>• Δ Gross NPE yoy</li> <li>• ...</li> </ul>
Clients	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Net New Clients</li> <li>• Improvement of Internal Service Quality (ISQ)</li> <li>• Reputation Index</li> <li>• External Customer Satisfaction index</li> <li>• ...</li> </ul>
Industrial levers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operating costs</li> <li>• Cross- selling excellence (CSE)</li> <li>• ...</li> </ul>
Human capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Talent Management and Succession Planning</li> <li>• People Engagement Index</li> <li>• ...</li> </ul>
Compliance culture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Compliance culture &amp; behaviour</li> <li>• Regulatory requirements and policy implementation</li> <li>• ...</li> </ul>
...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sustainability Governance/Culture</li> <li>• Audit effectiveness</li> <li>• ...</li> </ul>

The different categories represent financial and non-financial performance and are mapped into clusters of business, as shown in the picture below, to help identifying the most relevant standardized KPIs (all certified by relevant functions) for each business, with specific focus on risk-adjusted, sustainability-driven metrics and economic measures.

Sustainability KPIs (see next page) are the goals that meet current needs without compromising the ability of the Company to generate profit in the future and which have an impact on the creation of medium / long-term value for one or more stakeholders.

KPI Bluebook business clusters



### Stakeholder Value and KPI

The KPI Bluebook includes also sustainability indicators aiming at measuring client satisfaction, employees' engagement level, and Succession Planning Index (further details on Reputation, Internal Service Quality and Employees' Engagement are included in the Integrated Report published on UniCredit website).

#### Customer first benchmarking

- Definition: analysis of competitive positioning of UniCredit on the topic of strategic KPIs, such as reputation and customer satisfaction. Assessing the level of service provided, as well as image, both by Customers and Prospects
- Listening Methodology: the assessment is conducted on the main countries where the group operates, through an investigation that involves both Individual and Corporate segments. Respondents are customers of the banks of UniCredit and of the local competitors
- Used indexes: Customer First Index\*, as a combination of satisfaction and preference. Additional supporting behaviors will be measured, such as recommendation, share of wallet, propensity to buy, attrition risk, etc.
- Supplier: external research institute\*\*

#### Internal service quality

- Definition: analysis of satisfaction perceived by the Internal Customer, evaluating the Department which is providing the service. Purpose is to simplify the process and improve its effectiveness. In addition, specific Employee experiences may be measured, evaluated by the Employee quickly after the experience took place
- Listening Methodology: the assessment is conducted on the major group perimeters, through a periodic web survey, on Employees who have taken advantage of the services concerned
- Used indexes: Overall Satisfaction, Effort Score for Employees
- Supplier: external supplier\*\*

#### People engagement

- Definition: analysis of the company "climate" and of the "People engagement" (i.e. for the stakeholder Employee), in order to identify the drivers of motivation and satisfaction vis-à-vis the Company
- Listening methodology: the research is run for all Employees, and for all the group companies, through a recurring web survey
- Used indexes: Engagement Index, by a methodology in line with international best in class standards, and measured against group-wide defined thresholds
- Supplier of the technical platform is IBM, while the survey is managed internally by the People Insight function

#### Succession planning index

- Definition: The succession planning coverage ratio allowing to calculate the percentage of about 120 senior management group positions for which a successor pipeline has been identified. The aim is to assure a sustainable leadership pipeline
- Methodology: The succession plan analysis follows a structured process based on Executive Development Plan (EDP) outcomes
- Provider: Internal. The Coverage Ratio is yearly shared with the Board of Directors at the end of the process

**With reference to 2016, as shared with the Board of Directors, 88% of the strategic positions has a formalized succession plan**

#### EDP AT A GLANCE

- EDP is the Group Management Review process which allows to plan, manage and develop the group Leadership pipeline:
- ~ 3.700 Executives involved
  - Local EDP sessions to discuss all the position in EDP
  - The Top Management positions subject to the discussion with the Chief Executive Officer

\*From 2017  
 \*\* Under definition at March 2017

### Goal Setting Framework

With the reshaping of the group compensation approach, the Goal Setting process is impacted, especially for senior management that will have for 2017 a variable remuneration more aligned to the group long term value creation and results.

Since the new 2017-2019 Long Term Incentive Plan is launched, the Performance Screen for the Group CEO and the General Manager is not reported in this paragraph, as the LTIP for the CEO and the General Manager substitutes entirely the short term incentives. The LTIP scorecard is reported at Paragraph 5.5.

For the other senior managers for whom the 2017-2019 LTIP covers partially the total variable

remuneration, annual Performance Screens reflects mainly the targets related to the Strategic Plan *Transform 2019* (in particular for Business Roles) and aligned with the Risk Appetite Framework, with differences given by the perimeter of reference and the relevant activities.

Moreover, a specific KPI "Tone from the top" is envisaged, related to integrity towards conduct principles and spread of compliance and risk culture, to enhance overall organization awareness on these topics within the more general risk management framework.

The goal setting framework described above is the starting point for goal cascading to group Executives and lower levels, where applicable. In the picture below is reported an illustrative example of goal cascading.

**ILLUSTRATIVE**

Identified Staff	KPIs								
SEVP	ROAC		New bus. EL	Perf. stock EL	Δ Gross NPE yoy	Δ Op. costs	Cross selling	Tone from the top	
1st reporting line	ROAC (retail)	RACE (corp.)	New bus. EL	Perf. stock EL	Δ Gross NPE yoy	Δ Op. costs	Cross selling	Tone from the top	
2nd reporting line	ROAC (retail)	RACE (corp.)	New bus. EL	Perf. stock EL	Δ Gross NPE yoy	Δ Op. costs	Cross selling	Tone from the top	
Other reporting lines	ROAC (retail)	RACE (corp.)	Avg. PD	% rating aging	Δ Gross NPE yoy	Δ Op. costs	Cross selling	Tone from the top	

## 5.5 Group Long Term Incentive Plan (2017-2019 LTI Plan)

The Group Long Term Incentive Plan (2017-2019 LTI Plan), approved by the Board of Directors on January, 10 2017, is aimed at aligning senior management interests to the long term value creation for the shareholders, to share price and group performance appreciation and sustaining a sound and prudent risk management, orienting the performance management measurement on a multi-year horizon.

The Plan has also the characteristic to be qualified as a “retention” tool in order to retain key group resources for the achievement of the mid-long term group Strategy.

The 2017-2019 LTI Plan provides for an incentive in UniCredit free ordinary shares to employees who hold key roles within the UniCredit Group, in several installments and over a multi-year period, subject to the achievement of specific performance targets linked to the Strategic Plan *Transform 2019*.

### 2017-2019 LTI Plan: main features

<b>Amount at stake<sup>1</sup></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 100% of total max variable remuneration for CEO and GM</li> <li>• 50% of variable remuneration for SEVPs</li> <li>• 30% of variable remuneration for EVPs of UniCredit and of the Legal Entities of the group</li> <li>• Smaller amount for Key Players (up to 200)</li> </ul>
<b>Performance period</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 3 years (aligned to UniCredit Strategic Plan <i>Transform 2019</i>)</li> </ul>
<b>Deferral period</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 3 years deferral (Regulatory) subject to “malus” conditions<sup>2</sup></li> <li>• Additional compulsory holding years (after which the shares become free to sell, only if the share ownership guidelines are respected)</li> </ul>
<b>Performance awards</b>	<p>One award based on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gateway conditions on profitability, liquidity, capital and risk position</li> <li>• Achievement of a set of performance conditions focused on group targets, aligned to the Strategic Plan <i>Transform 2019</i></li> </ul>
<b>Vehicles and vesting</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 100% UniCredit Shares</li> <li>• Cliff vesting of the award for CEO; ratable vesting for GM, SEVPs, EVPs and other Key Players<sup>3</sup></li> <li>• Claw-back clause foreseen for 4 years after shares vesting</li> </ul>

<sup>1</sup> Defined upfront on the basis of 3 years of compensation  
<sup>2</sup> Malus conditions that reduce the payable amount based on profitability, liquidity, capital position  
<sup>3</sup> 100% upfront for Key Players not Identified Staff

### The potential beneficiaries of the LTI Plan are:

UniCredit Chief Executive Officer

UniCredit General Manager

Senior Executive Vice Presidents of UniCredit

Executive Vice Presidents of UniCredit and of the Legal Entities of the group

Other Key roles up to 200 beneficiaries, including selected Talents not belonging to the aforementioned clusters

The personnel belonging to Company Control Functions is not included in the Plan.

The different percentages of payments in shares, starting from 2020, are defined considering beneficiary categories, as described in the table below.

The assigned shares will be subject to a three-year deferral period from the date of approval of the LTI Plan, as required by law.

The overall final amount will be defined on the basis of the achievement of specific performance conditions linked to the Strategic Plan *Transform 2019*, subject to continuous employment at each date of payment.

Moreover, the shares will be assigned only on the basis of the respect of the minimum conditions of Company assets, capital and liquidity (“*malus condition*”), as well as in terms of the conduct of compliance with respect to the law, Company and group compliance rules, Company policies and to the


integrity values mentioned in the Code of Conduct (including claw-back clauses).

With reference to the performance period, if the threshold for the cumulative conditions is not reached, the award will be zeroed; on the other hand, the failure to reach the threshold for the conditions to be assessed at the end of each year implies the pro rata reduction of the incentive.

With reference to the deferral period, if the threshold for the cumulative conditions is not reached, the award will be reduced from 50% to 100%, based on the assessment of the general context in which the result has been reported; on the other side, the failure to reach the threshold for the conditions to be assessed at the end of each year implies the pro rata reduction of the incentive.

The claw-back rules are applied for the next 4 years to all payments regardless of the specific scenario (cliff or rateable vesting).

### LTI Plan 2017-2019



Gateways, Malus Conditions and Claw-back

Strategic Plan Transform 2019			Claw-back period			
2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
<b>PERFORMANCE PERIOD</b> <b>GATEWAYS &amp; RISK ADJUSTMENT</b>			<b>DEFERRAL PERIOD</b> <b>MALUS CONDITION<sup>10</sup></b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Σ 2017-19 NOP Adjusted<sup>4</sup> &gt; 0</li> <li>• Σ 2017-19 Net Profit<sup>5</sup> &gt; 0</li> <li>• CET1r fully loaded<sup>6,7</sup> ≥ 10.3%</li> <li>• Liquidity Coverage Ratio<sup>8,8</sup> &gt; 100%</li> <li>• Net Stable Funding Ratio<sup>6,9</sup> &gt; 100%</li> <li>• No significant breach of RAF across the period</li> </ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Σ 2020-22 NOP Adjusted<sup>4</sup> &gt; 0</li> <li>• Σ 2020-22 Net Profit<sup>5</sup> &gt; 0</li> <li>• CET1r fully loaded<sup>6,7</sup> ≥ 10.3%</li> <li>• Liquidity Coverage Ratio<sup>8,8</sup> &gt; 100%</li> <li>• Net Stable Funding Ratio<sup>6,9</sup> &gt; 100%</li> </ul>			

Evidence of misconduct or gross negligence by the beneficiary during the performance, deferral period and claw-back period (e.g. breach of code of conduct and other internal rules, especially concerning risks) will trigger malus & claw-back conditions

It is expected a correlation mechanism with risk, based on a qualitative assessment of the Risk Appetite Framework and carried out through the annual risk dashboard (more details in the parag. 5.3) during the Plan time horizon. Based on this assessment, a progressive reduction of the incentive can be envisaged until zeroing, in case of material breaches of RAF across the period.

It is foreseen also a qualitative assessment by the Remuneration Committee and the Board of Directors on the basis of non-purely formulistic elements, to keep into consideration the value creation for shareholders (i.e. Total Shareholder Return) in absolute and relative terms, the achievement

of further managerial KPIs included in the Plan *Transform 2019* (i.e. cross selling, funding gap, etc.), the market context, the remuneration trends, etc., that could reduce down to “zero” or increase up to maximum 20% the payments of the Plan (no upward discretionality for CEO). However, the overall final value of the assignments of the LTI Plan could not exceed the 100% of the original assignment.

Once the achievement of the performance indicators has been checked, the Board of Directors will grant the assignments of the shares, on the basis of the percentages of payments and the installments foreseen for the different beneficiary categories.

4 NOP excluding income from buy-back of own debt and from the fair value accounting of own liabilities.

5 Net Profit stated in the Balance Sheet, excluding any extraordinary items as considered appropriate by the Board of Directors upon Remuneration Committee proposal

6 Measured every year at Dec 31st

7 CET1 capital ratio is the CET1 capital of the institution expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure amount (RWA). Minimum CET1 required by BCE for the payment of variable compensations for 2017. For the next years, in case Regulatory Target changes the threshold will be updated accordingly. In case Regulatory Target is not envisaged, RAF threshold will be applied

8 The >100% threshold is defined as Limit in the 2017 RAF. This threshold is higher than the Minimum Regulatory Target for 2017 (80%). For the next years, in case of change in the Minimum Regulatory target as more restrictive than the threshold currently used, the same will be updated accordingly

9 The >100% threshold is defined as limit in the 2017 RAF, in absence of a Minimum Regulatory requirement for 2017 but foreseen for the 2018 (100%). For the next years, in case of change in the Minimum Regulatory Target as more restrictive than the threshold currently used, the same will be updated accordingly

10 Malus conditions are measured on a yearly basis before the payment of the deferred installments

For the purpose of determining the number of shares to be allocated, the performance indicators specified in the LTI Plan and evaluated at the end of the period of the Plan, consistent with Plan *Transform 2019* targets, are the following ones for all beneficiaries<sup>11</sup>

	KPI	Perimeter	Weight	Target <i>Transform 2019</i>	Assessment criteria	
					Threshold	Payout
Value creation	ROAC	Group	50%	9%	≥ 9%	100%
					8% - 9%	0% - 100% <sup>2</sup>
					< 8%	0%
Industrial sustainability	Cost/Income ratio	Group	25%	52%	≤ 52%	100%
					55% - 52%	0% - 100% <sup>2</sup>
					> 55%	0%
Risk	NET <sup>1</sup> NPE	Group	25%	20.2 bn	≤ 20.2 bn	100%
					22 - 20.2 bn	0% - 100% <sup>2</sup>
					> 22 bn	0%

1 Net Non Performing Exposure (after provisions)

2 Linear progression (eg. 50% payout for ROAC at 8.5%)

For the selection of performance indicators, a limited number of specific indicators has been included, taking into consideration the trade-off between the clarity and immediacy of the evaluation, versus the inclusion of a greater number of KPIs, which would offer a broader coverage but less incisiveness on the final evaluation.

In addition, target referred to the group perimeter have been defined for all participants, in order to ensure alignment to Plan *Transform 2019*, as announced to the market.

As required by law, distribution of share payments foresees share retention periods (a retention period of 2 years for upfront shares and of 1 year for deferred shares).

The 2017-2019 LTI Plan could also be offered during the hiring process of new employees that would cover key roles in the group, until December 31, 2017, with a pro-quota participation.

Share conversion price was defined on the basis of the average price of shares during the 30 days prior the Board of Directors of Jan 10, 2017 that approved the Plan. The price, in line with the decision taken during the same session of the Board of Directors, has been then adjusted following the reverse stock split and by applying the AIAF adjustment factor (“K Factor”) to neutralize the dilutive effect of the Share Capital increase for cash<sup>12</sup>. The final price resuming from these adjustments is equal to € 13.816.

11 As specified in the par. 5.4, for the Group Chief Executive Officer and for the General Manager, the LTI Plan substitutes entirely the short term incentives

12 Share Capital increase and reverse stock split approved by the General Shareholders’ Meeting on January 12, 2017

13 Fully loaded in the first year

The maximum number of shares to be allocated under the Plan is equal to 7,000,000, of which 1,200,000 devoted to potential new hirings. The CEO and the General Manager are allocated a maximum number of 521,134 shares each.

The 2017-2019 LTI Plan envisages an expected impact on UniCredit share capital of approximately 0.31%<sup>13</sup>, assuming that all the free shares will be assigned to employees. The total dilution for all share plans currently in place, including 2017 Group Incentive System, equals 1.75%.

The Board of Directors could establish to assign free UniCredit ordinary shares that will be freely transferable at the end of the shares retention period, or in the year of the assignment, but subject to restrictions on the transfer for the share retention period (2 years for upfront payments and 1 year for deferred payments).

During the implementation phase, potential changes can be made to the LTI Plan, in order to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations from time to time in force in the countries where the group Legal Entities are established. Such amendments shall be adopted in accordance with the provisions applicable and in particular with the “*Disposizioni di Vigilanza per le Banche in materia di politiche e prassi di remunerazione e incentivazione*” (Circolare n.285 of December 17, 2013, 7th update of November 18, 2014).

# 6. Group Employee Share Ownership Plan

*UniCredit affirms the value of share ownership as a valuable tool for enabling the engagement, affiliation and alignment of interests among shareholders, management and the overall employee population.*

In 2008 the UniCredit Group Employee Share Ownership Plan “Let’s Share” (The Plan) was launched for the first time, offering to employees the possibility to invest in UniCredit ordinary shares at favourable conditions. So far, more than 10,000 individuals have participated in “Let’s Share” from 14 countries overall: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and the United Kingdom.

The Plan offers to participants the opportunity to purchase UniCredit shares, receiving a 25% discount in the form of free shares granted by the Company,

subject to a 1-year holding period. The Plan provides for the shares to be purchased on the market with no diluting impact on share capital.

For 2017, as approved by the Annual General Meeting on April 14, 2016 and in connection with the 2016-2019 Strategic Plan *Transform 2019*, the 2016 Employee Share Ownership Plan (“Let’s Share for 2017”) will be launched.

During the Strategic Plan horizon, new solutions can be evaluated to enhance employee share ownership.

# 7. Compensation Data

## 7.1 2016 Remuneration Outcomes

The vested component refers to cash and equity awards to which the right has been matured as the performance conditions have been achieved.

- the vested components in cash refer to Group Incentive System 2013, 2014 and 2015 and, if present, to other forms of variable remuneration
- the vested components in shares refer to Group Incentive Systems 2012, 2013 and 2014 and, if present, to other forms of variable remuneration.

The unvested component refers to cash and equity awards to which the right has not yet matured and for which any potential future gain has not been yet realized and remains subject to future performance.

- the unvested components in cash refer to Group Incentive Systems 2015 and, if present, to other forms of variable remuneration

- the unvested components in shares refer to Group Incentive Systems 2013, 2014, 2015 and, if present, to other forms of variable remuneration.

The value of the shares shown as unvested equity is calculated considering the arithmetic mean of the official market closing price of UniCredit ordinary shares during the period February 8 - March 8, 2017.

Variable remuneration paid in 2016 from previous exercises includes payouts based on demonstrated multi-year performance achievements related to Group Incentive Systems plans and, if present, to other forms of variable remuneration.

All stock options granted under existing Group LTI plans represent zero gain for the beneficiaries as long as the entry conditions will not allow the exercise.

Population (as at Dec 31, 2016)	Num.	Fix <sup>1</sup>	Variable 2016				Deferred Variable from previous exercises				Variable paid in 2016 from previous exercises	
			Upfront		Deferred		Vested in 2016		Un-Vested		€	Shares
			€	Shares	€	Shares	€	Shares	€	Shares		
CEO	2	4,000	0	0	0	0	275	0	440	1,280	770	0
Other executive Directors	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non executive Directors	18	4,564	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
General Manager	1	1,200	0	0	0	0	291	148	200	622	444	277
Deputy General Manager & SEVP	18	13,416	1,272	0	1,871	3,119	2,928	2,027	2,484	10,150	5,068	2,493
EVP	106	41,022	3,409	0	4,223	7,062	7,172	4,823	5,805	23,684	12,869	9,345
SVP	438	94,295	9,745	0	6,660	12,074	10,951	6,195	8,327	29,531	24,853	16,918
Other relevant staff	485	86,472	14,015	0	6,849	16,703	7,544	2,897	3,928	21,458	22,679	5,172

<sup>1</sup> 2016 full year gross fixed remuneration, except for Non Executive Directors, whose fees are those actually paid for 2016 and calculated pro rata on the basis of the methodology provided by Article 84-quater of Consob Issuers Regulation no. 11971

During 2016, 20 beneficiaries were awarded a total remuneration equal to or greater than € 1m. In particular:

Total Compensation	N° Identified staff
1 ≤ TC < 1.5 m	13
1.5 ≤ TC < 2 m	3
2 ≤ TC < 2.5 m	4
2.5 ≤ TC < 3 m	0
3 ≤ TC < 3.5 m	0
3.5 ≤ TC < 4 m	0
4 ≤ TC < 4.5 m	0
4.5 ≤ TC < 5 m	0
TC ≥ 5 m	0

Severance and sign-on payments paid during the financial year to 61 Identified Staff amounted to € 58,610,924 (the highest severance paid to a single person was equal to € 9,586,284). The payments were determined in line with Group Policy guidelines and relevant legal and contractual framework.

The total compensation costs at group level amounted at € 7,124 m in 2017, out of which the variable compensation pool amounted € 417 m.

## 7.2 2017 Remuneration Policy

Total compensation policy for non-Executive Directors, Group Identified Staff and for the overall group employee population demonstrates in particular how:

- remuneration of the non-Executive Directors, as approved by the AGM, does not include variable performance-related pay
- variable remuneration for Group Identified Staff is in line with their strategic role, regulatory requirements and our pay for performance culture
- the general employee population is offered a balanced pay-mix in line with the role, scope and business or market context of reference.

In line with Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) a specific limit to the ratio of the variable and fix component of the compensation has been established.

Group Employee Population	Compensation Pay-Mix	
	Fixed and other non-performance related Pay	Variable performance-related Pay
Non-executive Directors		
Chairman and Vice-Chairman	100%	0%
Directors	100%	0%
Statutory Auditors	100%	0%
Group Employee Population		
Business Areas <sup>2</sup>	94%	6%
Corporate center / Support functions <sup>3</sup>	95%	5%
Overall Group Total	94%	6%

## 7.3 Benefits Data

Our employees enjoy welfare, healthcare and life balance benefits that supplement social security plans with minimum contractual requirements. These benefits are intended to provide substantial guarantees for the well-being of staff and their family members during their active careers as well as in retirement.

In Italy, among the complementary pension plans, there are defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans. In both plans, benefits are paid out once the retirement requirements are satisfied. In defined benefit plans the benefit is known in advance, while in defined contribution plans the benefit depends on asset management results.

Complementary pension plans working for UniCredit Group are external pension funds, legally autonomous from the group.

These plans are closed and do not allow new

subscriptions, the only exception is represented by the defined contribution plan section of the “Fondo Pensione per il Personale delle Aziende del Gruppo UniCredit” (which was composed by approximately 35.000 enrolled active employees in 2015, as reported in the 2015 Pension Fund Annual Report). Within this section subscribers can distribute their contribution – depending on their own risk appetite – among various investment lines (one in the Insurance sector, three in the Finance sector- corresponding to Short, Medium and Long Term options), characterized by different risk/yield ratios. In addition, the enrolled employees may open complementary pension plan positions in favor of their family members dependent for tax purposes.

Moreover, in most countries where UniCredit is present, retirement plans are available for the employees. More details and information can be found in our Integrated Report and the relevant Supplement.

<sup>2</sup> Commercial Banking Italy (excluding the local Corporate Centre), Commercial Banking Germany (excluding the local Corporate Centre), Commercial Banking Austria (excluding the local Corporate Centre), Corporate & Investment Banking (excluding the governance functions), Asset Gathering, CEE, Non-Core  
<sup>3</sup> Corporate Center Global, Global Banking Services, the governance functions in CIB and the local Corporate Centres in Italy, Germany and Austria

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We're there for both.



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